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BARBARIANS AT THE GATEKEEPERS?: 
A PROPOSAL FOR A MODIFIED STRICT 
LIABILITY REGIME 
FRANK PARTNOY* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Legal scholars long have recognized that investment banking, accounting, 
and law firms can act as private gatekeepers to financial markets.1 However, 
scholars have not settled the questions of when and whether such 
gatekeepers2 should be liable for misrepresentations or fraud by public 
issuers of securities.3 The answers to these questions depend, of course, on 
both the reputational and legal constraints imposed on gatekeepers’ activities. 
Because scholars continue to debate the scope of these constraints, it is 
unsurprising that the question of what role gatekeepers should play in 
modern, rapidly-evolving financial markets remains open. 
 
 
 * Professor, University of San Diego School of Law; J.D., Yale Law School. The author thanks 
Jack Coffee, Jim Cox, Ron Gilson, Tom Smith, Judge Stanley Sporkin, and John Tishler for comments 
on an earlier draft, as well as the Institute for Law & Economic Policy and the University of San Diego 
School of Law for their generous support. 
 1. See Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 916, 934-49 (1998); 
Michael P. Dooley, The Effects or Civil Liability on Investment Banking and the New Issues Market, 
58 VA. L. REV. 776, 794-95 (1972); Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal 
Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 288-93 (1984); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, 
The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984); Howell E. Jackson, Reflections on 
Kaye, Scholer: Enlisting Lawyers to Improve the Regulation of Financial Institutions, 66 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1019, 1049-72 (1993); Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of 
Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 895-96 (1984) [hereinafter Kraakman, Corporate Liability 
Strategies]; Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 
2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986) [hereinafter Kraakman, Gatekeepers].  
 2. Legal scholars are not entirely clear about what they mean by “gatekeeper”, especially 
regarding which gate is being kept and who or what is on either side of this gate. Reinier H. Kraakman 
has argued that the essential certification for an issuer’s wrongdoing to proceed is, at least in theory, 
the “gate” the gatekeeper keeps. See Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 1, at 54. This definition is not 
entirely consistent with the historical meaning of “gatekeeper”. Ronald J. Gilson suggested that 
“gatekeeper” and “reputational intermediary” may have entirely different meanings. Ronald Gilson, 
Remarks at the Washington University Law School and Institute for Law and Economic Policy 
Corporate Accountability Symposium (Mar. 9-10, 2001). In any event, whatever the definition of the 
term “gatekeeper”, this Article assumes it includes investment banking, accounting, and law firms in 
their activities related to securities issues.  
 3. See, e.g., Choi, supra note 1 (advocating intermediate market-based due diligence regime for 
gatekeepers); Victor P. Goldberg, Accountable Accountants: Is Third-Party Liability Necessary?, 17 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 295 (1988) (advocating against third party liability for auditors and arguing that 
reputation provides a sufficient incentive for auditors to detect fraud); Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra 
note 1 (advocating due diligence duties and liabilities for underwriters to protect against issuer fraud). 
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At the same time, a substantial number of problems and costs associated 
with gatekeepers have come to plague financial markets. Expenses associated 
with underwriting are considerable, yet investment banks face demonstrated 
conflicts of interest, frequently do not uncover issuer misrepresentations or 
fraud, and, in part because they generally are indemnified by issuers, rarely 
pay securities fraud-related damages. Accounting firms earn substantial fees 
but often lack independence and increasingly fail to detect errors in financial 
statements; the number of restated financial statements from the past two 
years was staggering. Law firms spend untold hours engaging in due 
diligence activities but offer extraordinarily narrow representations in their 
legal opinions related to securities issues. Most importantly, litigation against 
gatekeepers is increasingly costly and uncertain, a situation that also 
increases the ex ante costs of insuring against liability.  
This Article fills a few of the gaps in current scholarship about 
gatekeepers and sets forth a proposal for a modified strict liability regime that 
would avoid many of the problems and costs associated with the current due 
diligence-based approaches. Under the proposed regime, gatekeepers would 
be strictly liable for any securities fraud damages paid by the issuer pursuant 
to a settlement or judgment. Gatekeepers would not have any due diligence-
based defenses for securities fraud. Instead, gatekeepers could limit their 
liability by agreeing to and disclosing a percentage limitation on the scope of 
their liability for the issuer’s damages.  
For example, a gatekeeper for an issue might agree ex ante to strict 
liability for ten percent of the issuer’s liability related to the issuance, 
measured by the actual cash paid by the issuer pursuant to a settlement or 
judgment, or by the present value of such amount. A particular gatekeeper’s 
liability would be limited to the issuer’s liability related to that gatekeeper’s 
role (for example, counsel for the issuer or the underwriters generally would 
not be liable for material misstatements or omissions in audited financial 
statements). The percentage for each gatekeeper could range based on 
competitive bargaining and market forces, with a minimum limit, such as the 
amount of the gatekeeper’s fee4 or perhaps a fixed amount of one to five 
percent, set by law.  
This modified strict liability proposal solves two important and parallel 
problems in securities regulation. The first problem is the rapidly increasing 
and substantial cost related to the role of gatekeepers in securities fraud, 
including both the costs of behavior designed to capture the benefit of due 
diligence-based defenses and, more importantly, the costs of resolving 
 
 
 4. The author would like to thank Jim Cox for this suggestion. 
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disputes about gatekeeper behavior. The securities law defenses available to 
gatekeepers have created incentives for them to engage in costly activities 
they otherwise might avoid and have resulted in deadweight costs associated 
with concentrated market structures, high barriers to entry, and inefficient 
winner-take-all markets.5 
A second problem is that the value of gatekeeper certification is declining 
while costs are increasing. Gatekeepers are failing to uncover financial fraud 
in an increasing number of cases.6 In modern financial markets, gatekeepers 
simply do not have the time or resources to undertake adequate investigation 
of many securities issues. Examples pervade the investment banking, 
accounting, and securities law industries.7 
This combination of high costs and low accuracy should be troubling to 
legal scholars, especially when coupled with abundant evidence of the 
dominant cultures and norms of gatekeepers, and most particularly (hence the 
title of this Article) underwriters. Although much of this evidence is 
anecdotal, it suggests that such cultures and norms concur with the notion 
that gatekeepers profit from certain structural advantages created by 
securities regulation in order to leverage their accumulated reputation capital 
in financial markets in ways that generate great private benefits but greater 
social costs.  
Part II of this Article assesses some of the arguments about gatekeepers as 
reputational intermediaries. In particular, it considers arguments that 
reputation alone might not be a sufficient incentive to create optimal 
gatekeeper behavior. Part III challenges the assumption that gatekeepers act 
as reputational intermediaries and argues that legal scholars have prematurely 
assumed that particular gatekeepers (for example, Underwriters Laboratories, 
Inc. and bond credit rating agencies) prosper because of incentives to 
preserve their reputational capital. Part III also considers the role of 
regulation, regulatory costs, and “regulator licenses” (valuable property 
 
 
 5. For a description of the phenomenon of winner-take-all markets, see generally ROBERT H. 
FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY: WHY THE FEW AT THE TOP GET SO 
MUCH MORE THAN THE REST OF US (1995).  
 6. Numerous recent cases demonstrate the failure of gatekeepers to detect various types of 
financial fraud. See, e.g., Michael Brick, 4 Former Executives Charged With Doctoring Profit Data, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2001, at C9 (describing the indictment against managers of Aurora Foods for 
manipulation of financial statements where managers allegedly fooled auditors from 
PricewaterhouseCoopers by disabling their accounting software and creating another set of accounting 
books and records); Mark Maremont, Lawsuit Details Rite Aid’s Accounting Woes, WALL ST. J., Feb. 
8, 2001, at C1, C14 (describing a major accounting scandal at Rite Aid Corp. involving former auditor 
KPMG, L.L.P.). The Aurora Foods example is notable because it would have been very costly for any 
gatekeeper to have uncovered the fraud. Consequently, any ex ante costs incurred to detect the fraud 
and any ex post costs incurred to determine the auditors’ liability would be of negligible societal value.  
 7. See infra Part III.C. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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rights created by regulation) in distorting the reputational incentives of 
gatekeepers. In addition, it explains where applicable securities regulation 
might create regulatory costs or regulatory licenses of the type that would 
enable gatekeepers to engage in reputation-depleting activities with relatively 
little cost. Part IV outlines the modified strict liability approach described 
briefly above and explains some of its advantages and weaknesses. 
 
II. A REASSESSMENT OF THE ROLE OF REPUTATIONAL INTERMEDIARIES 
 
The literature on financial market gatekeepers relies on various theoretical 
arguments about reputation, including a characterization of gatekeepers as 
reputational intermediaries. This Part considers these theoretical arguments 
and discusses additional points that both support and undercut what seems to 
be a dominant scholarly view of the role of reputational intermediaries in 
financial markets. Part II.A attempts to persuade scholars to focus more 
carefully on particular details in arguments that gatekeepers serve the role of 
reputational intermediary. Part II.B explores arguments related to some of 
those details. 
A. Theoretical Bases for the Reputational Intermediaries Argument 
For centuries, scholars have noted the importance of reputational capital 
in sustaining a self-policing society.8 Over time, individuals or institutions 
acquire reputations based on their behavior. A “good” reputation is valuable 
in transacting with other parties, and reputational capital enables parties to 
use trust to reduce the costs of transacting. On the other hand, a “bad” 
reputation is costly in future transactions, because other parties will demand 
assurances that future behavior will differ from past behavior. 
In theory, these long-standing arguments about reputational capital apply 
to the sellers of all goods, including securities or advice related to securities. 
As the argument goes, an issuer of securities has an incentive both to disclose 
to investors the quality of the securities it is selling and to invest in its 
reputation for quality in order to persuade investors that the issuer is bonded 
 
 
 8. See ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JUSTICE, POLICE, REVENUE, AND ARMS 253-54 (Edwin 
Cannan ed., 1896) (noting that a person engaging in a substantial number of repeated transactions with 
neighbors cannot cheat because of the reputational consequences, while a person dealing with 
strangers is disposed to cheat because of the lack of reputational consequences). See also DOUGLAS G. 
BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 159-87 (1994) (describing reputational effects generally 
in repeated games); Douglas W. Diamond, Reputational Acquisition in Debt Markets, 97 J. POL. 
ECON. 828 (1989) (setting forth a detailed economic model of reputational capital as applied to debt 
issuers).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss2/3
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to provide high-quality securities, as disclosed. If the securities turn out to be 
of low quality and investors observe this fact, the issuer will suffer a 
reputational loss and will incur a higher cost of capital in the future.  
Thus, one can view a reputation for quality in the issuance of securities as 
an investment that bonds the issuer by forcing the issuer to incur costs if the 
securities turn out to be of low quality.9 When information is expensive ex 
ante, but not ex post, issuers can make capital investments in brand name or 
reputation as a way of signaling the quality of information, as follows: issuers 
signal their belief that when investors learn the truth about this information 
ex post, the issuers’ representations will prove correct. Issuers with plans to 
access the capital markets repeatedly will consider the fact that investors who 
are disappointed ex post will demand a higher cost of capital for future 
issues. Issuers will internalize these costs and, as the argument goes, will 
disclose material facts to investors in current issues to avoid increases in 
costs of future issues. 
This “classical” view of reputational capital echoes the mandatory 
disclosure debate about whether issuers have adequate incentives (based on 
their reputational capital) to disclose material facts or whether issuers instead 
have incentives to behave opportunistically and therefore should be 
constrained. However, this Article is not the appropriate place to revisit the 
mandatory disclosure debate, and the argument about gatekeeper liability, 
while based on the above arguments, does not require such an extensive 
discussion.  
Instead, the arguments about gatekeeper liability assume that issuers do 
not have adequate incentives to disclose all material facts. The arguments in 
favor of gatekeeper liability assume that when it is too costly for the issuer to 
bond itself (for example, the issuer lacks the capital or time necessary for a 
credible investment in reputation), one or more third party intermediaries will 
be able to step in to offer their reputation as a replacement for the issuer’s 
bond. 
Like issuers, gatekeepers face reputation-related incentives. If buyers of 
securities find it too expensive to determine on their own whether an issue is 
worth the price, or if an issuer finds it too costly to convince buyers that the 
issuer’s information is accurate, a reputable gatekeeper might be able to 
 
 
 9. See, e.g., Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 604 (noting that “[a] typical but costly form of 
signaling is the investment by sellers in firm-specific capital, such as reputation and advertising, whose 
value would be reduced if the quality of the product were lower than represented”). Generally, bonding 
occurs when the originator of information puts at risk an asset to be forfeited if information is less 
accurate than warranted. See generally Yoram Barzel, Measurement Cost and the Organization of 
Markets, 25 J.L. & ECON. 27 (1982). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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bridge this gap.10 If reputational markets work efficiently, then gatekeepers 
should screen against fraudulent transactions to safeguard their reputations, 
even without the prospect of legal liability.11 But why would reputational 
markets be efficient for gatekeepers and not for issuers? 
For scholars who believe issuer regulation is necessary, the question 
becomes how and whether a regulatory regime governing gatekeepers might 
improve upon the regulatory regime governing issuers. In other words, what 
is added by imposing liability on gatekeepers? Alternatively, are there 
reasons why reputational arguments might carry the day for gatekeepers 
when they could not do so for issuers? 
In this context, rejection of issuer reputation arguments but acceptance of 
gatekeeper reputation arguments without some strong justification should 
seem odd. Yet this is precisely what many legal academics apparently have 
done.12 Legal scholars frequently assume that gatekeepers do not knowingly 
certify low-quality issuers as high-quality, although some academics have 
recognized the possibility of economic benefit from inaccurate certification.13 
Since Reinier Kraakman first introduced the general argument for imposing 
gatekeeper liability in 1986,14 even commentators who favor gatekeeper 
liability have done so primarily because liability forces the gatekeeper’s 
 
 
 10. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Re-Engineering Corporate Disclosure: The Coming Debate over 
Company Registration, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1143, 1169 (1996) (arguing that underwriters of a 
public offering certify the quality of the offering); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 619, 616 n.180 
(“[T]he investment banker has a role to play whenever verification is costly.”). In addition, by hiring a 
gatekeeper intermediary, directors delegate their duties to a third party who does not owe the same 
duties to shareholders. See, e.g., Robert J. Guiffra, Jr., Note, Investment Bankers’ Fairness Opinions in 
Corporate Control Transactions, 96 YALE L.J. 119, 120-21 (1986) (noting that courts have held that 
directors discharge their fiduciary duties by hiring investment bankers and that courts have not held 
that investment bankers rendering fairness opinions owe fiduciary duties to shareholders). 
 11. See Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 1, at 61. 
 12. Numerous legal scholars seem persuaded by the reputational arguments as they relate to 
gatekeepers and especially as to underwriters of securities. Consider the following example:  
Finally, the underwriters have reputations at stake every time they do an offering. If the public 
perceives that it has been defrauded, it will not only blame the company's managers for the fraud, 
but also the underwriters for a failure to do adequate diligence in investigating the company (if not 
blaming them for collusion with the company managers). Hence, if the underwriters know there is 
likely to be undisclosed, but material, negative unripe information they will request: (1) a lower 
initial price for the securities, and (2) disclosure of the information or a forecast that will convey 
the gist of the information. Therefore, even if the company's management is in its final period and 
has an incentive to withhold material unripe information, the underwriters serve a gatekeeping 
function in ensuring that this does not happen.  
Mitu Gulati, When Corporate Managers Fear a Good Thing Is Coming to an End: The Case of Interim 
Nondisclosure, 46 UCLA L. REV. 675, 711 (1999) (emphasis added).  
 13. See, e.g., Choi, supra note 1, at 925 (beginning with arguments based on these assumptions); 
id. at 928 (recognizing limitations of these assumptions). 
 14. See generally Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 1. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss2/3
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reputation to operate as a constraint.15 
Several scholars have used Kraakman’s framework to argue that liability 
should not be imposed on gatekeepers in various contexts. For example, 
Howell Jackson has argued against the current system of attorney-gatekeeper 
liability.16 Stephen Choi has argued against the current system of 
underwriter-gatekeeper liability.17 Several legal scholars have argued that 
outside of the United States, other organizational structures evolve to serve 
the monitoring or gatekeeping function.18 Perhaps most significantly, Donald 
Langevoort has suggested that technological changes could expand the range 
of capital raising options, thereby eliminating the role of “gatekeeper”, at 
least for investment bankers.19  
However, absent from much of this scholarly debate is a focus on the 
argument that economically rational gatekeepers, like economically rational 
issuers, will balance the benefits and costs of accurate (or inaccurate) 
certification in an effort to maximize profits. On one hand, gatekeepers may 
achieve short-term gains20 by providing inaccurate certification or by 
overstating the value of securities. On the other hand, gatekeepers could 
suffer long-term losses from a decline in reputation if investors realize that 
the gatekeeper originally overstated the assessment of value.21 Although 
 
 
 15. “Although there are multiple forces that drive our disclosure system, the risk of liability is 
one of the most significant, and it motivates independent gatekeeepers to test and, if necessary, 
challenge the issuer’s proposed disclosure.” RICHARD W. JENNINGS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 924 (8th ed. 1998) (citing separate statements of John C. Coffee, Jr., Edward 
Greene, and Lawrence W. Sonsini, that the Form 8-K requirement is one means of increasing 
gatekeeper liability). 
 16. See Howell E. Jackson, supra note 1, at 1049-72 (disfavoring gatekeeper liability of 
attorneys). Howell Jackson has argued that holding companies can play a self-monitoring and a 
gatekeeping role. See Howell E. Jackson, The Expanding Obligations of Financial Holding 
Companies, 107 HARV. L. REV. 507, 559-72 (1994). 
 17. See Choi, supra note 1, at 934-49 (disfavoring gatekeeper liability of underwriters). 
 18. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, Investment Companies as Guardian 
Shareholders: The Place of MSIC in the Corporate Governance Debate, 45 STAN. L. REV. 985 (1993) 
(discussing the role of European MSICs); Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Understanding the 
Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization, 102 YALE 
L.J. 871 (1993) (discussing the role of monitoring structures in Japan). 
 19. See Donald C. Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of Securities 
Regulation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 747, 778 (1985). Donald Langevoort also has noted that if investment 
bankers are not serving a gatekeeping function, there is little rationale for burdening investment 
bankers with due diligence requirements. Id. 
 20. The gains might be from higher fees or future business generated by the gatekeeper’s 
willingness to engage in inaccurate certification. 
 21. To clarify this point, suppose an issuer sells securities with a value of fifty dollars. The buyer 
does not trust the issuer’s representation that the securities are worth fifty dollars. If a gatekeeper can 
credibly represent the actual value of the securities to the buyer (i.e., if transaction and information 
costs are zero), the buyer will pay fifty dollars. If the gatekeeper represented to the buyer that the 
securities were worth fifty dollars, when they actually were worth only twenty-five dollars, the buyer 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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investors will discount the securities of issuers who use disreputable 
intermediaries, gatekeepers should be willing to incur losses in reputational 
capital so long as the gains from inaccurate certifications exceed the costs. 
Gatekeepers facing substantial expected costs from a loss of reputational 
capital generally will not seek short-term gains from inaccurate certifications. 
Gatekeepers who, for whatever reason, would not expect substantial 
reductions in future fees from an inaccurate certification, or who greatly 
discount such reductions, will have an incentive to engage in inaccurate 
certification. 
Gatekeepers will not necessarily find it economically rational to engage in 
reputation-depleting activities. Nevertheless, a strong theoretical argument 
exists supporting the conclusion that gatekeepers might rationally decide to 
deplete their reputational capital (just as they would deplete any other capital 
asset) in an attempt to maximize expected profits. If this argument is correct, 
then proponents of the reputational intermediary view should take the 
argument seriously and either refute it (if the arguments or empirical 
evidence support such a refutation) or incorporate it as a possible alternative 
view. 
Reputational arguments related to gatekeepers are complex. Based on the 
complexity of the arguments, it seems just as inappropriate to assume 
gatekeepers always will play the role of reputational intermediary as it is to 
assume issuers always will choose to make complete and accurate 
disclosures. Why assume IBM will act to maximize the value of its 
reputational capital by depleting such capital when the benefits exceed the 
costs but not also assume Goldman Sachs will do the same? With this caveat, 
the next section considers in greater detail some specific arguments that 
reputation alone is not a viable constraint on gatekeeper certification. 
 
 
might pay fifty dolars in a one-off transaction. But if the buyer paid fifty dollars, and later discovered 
that the securities were worth only twenty-five dollars and that the gatekeeper knew this, the buyer 
would discount the gatekeeper’s future representations of the value of securities. The next time the 
gatekeeper tried to certify a securities issue, the buyer, and perhaps other buyers, would refuse to buy 
the securities for the represented value. (In the limit, the buyer would pay nothing for the issuer’s 
securities.) To the extent the gatekeeper anticipated future issuances, the gatekeeper would need to 
factor in these future costs. An economically rational gatekeeper would face powerful incentives to 
invest in his or her reputation and to represent the true value of his or her securities. However, if the 
gatekeeper could capture a substantial fee (say five dollars) for representing that securities were worth 
fifty dollars when they actually were worth only twenty-five dollars, the gatekeeper might rationally 
choose to make such a misrepresentation if the expected present value of the reduction in future fees 
was less than the fee to be earned for the current issue. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss2/3
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B. Limits to the Reputational Intermediaries Argument as Applied to 
Gatekeepers 
This section considers some arguments about when gatekeepers might 
add value in the certification process. The specific question is when might 
gatekeepers fulfill functions that issuers cannot fulfill because of the high 
transaction costs of proving to investors that the issuer’s assessment of 
quality is truthful and accurate. In these instances, the reputational 
intermediaries argument is the strongest; and so, perhaps, is the rationale for 
imposing additional liability on gatekeepers. 
Gatekeepers are most likely to add value when more direct forms of 
antifraud liability are weak, for example, when issuers make judgments that 
the expected cost of material misrepresentations or omissions is less than 
their benefits. This expected cost might be low either because the magnitude 
of punishment is low or because the probability of detection is low.22 
Constraints on issuers might fail for many reasons,23 seven of which follow.  
1. Issuer Misconduct and Asset Inadequacy 
First, issuer misconduct might be expensive to detect or prosecute. If the 
probability of detection is low or if the probability of successful prosecution 
is low, issuers might rationally elect to engage in an activity even if the stated 
penalty associated with that activity is very high. Put another way, it might be 
necessary to set penalties at a very high level in order to prevent issuers from 
engaging in misconduct. Moreover, because penalties on issuers are limited 
to the issuers’ net assets, gatekeeper liability might be necessary in order to 
police issuers who otherwise would avoid paying the full cost of expected 
liability.24  
There are several limits, however, to the argument about issuer assets and 
expected liability. First, issuers could post bonds to cover any shortfall in net 
assets, although they would be limited in the collateral they could pledge to 
support such bonds. Second, issuers could incur the full expected cost of a 
penalty by purchasing insurance, although again issuers might favor the 
 
 
 22. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff Between the 
Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 880, 884 (1979) (discussing difficulties of 
making such tradeoffs when probability of detection is low). 
 23. See Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 1, at 56-57. 
 24. To the extent there are practical limitations on issuer liability, a whistleblowing regime might 
be an attractive theoretical alternative to a regime of gatekeeper liability. “As compared to 
gatekeeping, mandatory whistleblowing imposes much larger potential losses on suspected 
wrongdoers.” Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 1, at 59. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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possibility of uninsured bankruptcy rather than the certainty of paying the full 
expected cost of penalty. Third, gatekeeper net assets will not necessarily be 
greater than issuer net assets or at least not sufficiently greater to make a 
difference to investors. Firms with net assets greatly in excess of a 
gatekeeper’s net assets frequently choose to use a gatekeeper. In addition, a 
gatekeeper with a higher cost of capital or higher probability of bankruptcy 
would not be as valuable in a third party certification role. Notwithstanding 
these limits, the argument about asset inadequacy makes some sense; to the 
extent issuer net assets are not sufficiently deep to make securities fraud 
penalties viable, the gatekeeper’s role may fill a gap. 
2. Agency Costs 
A second reason why reliance on gatekeepers might improve the 
reputational and legal constraints on issuers is that agency costs might 
prevent issuers from reaching optimal decisions without third party 
intervention. If managers can act to benefit themselves at the expense of 
investors (even if investors would be better off increasing managers’ 
compensation in an amount equal to the value of this benefit), third party 
gatekeepers can act as monitors of management.  
This argument also has limits because gatekeepers face agency costs as 
well. Agency costs facing smaller “partnership”-oriented gatekeepers 
(including, perhaps, some law firms) are likely to be less than those that face 
large publicly held firms with centralized management. However, the major 
gatekeepers, especially gatekeepers for underwriting and independent 
auditing, are large, multinational companies with tens of thousands of 
employees. Even if gatekeeper managers do not face incentives to deplete the 
reputation of the entity for short-term gain, lower-level employees might face 
precisely those incentives. It is especially costly to monitor such employees, 
given the annual bonus compensation structure of most gatekeepers and the 
incentives for employees to maximize short-term profits. Thus, some 
gatekeepers likely apply a very high discount rate to the expected future costs 
associated with engaging in potentially reputation-depleting activity.  
3. Repeat Play 
A third reason for the reliance on gatekeepers is the extent to which 
issuers and gatekeepers are repeat players in their respective businesses. The 
amount of expected repeat play greatly affects decisions by both issuers and 
gatekeepers about whether to engage in reputation-depleting activities. The 
costs of such activities relate directly to the expected future cost of a depleted 
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reputation, which depends on the extent to which the issuer or gatekeeper 
expects to have future dealings with investors. So far as issuers have 
incentives to make false representations in order to maximize their own 
profits, gatekeepers might also face such incentives. Gilson and Kraakman 
have recognized that an investment in reputation cannot wholly eliminate the 
incentive to behave opportunistically, especially in an end period when, as 
they put it, a seller has an incentive to invest in reputation as bait to catch 
more valuable fish.25 The same factors that limit the ability of reputational 
and legal constraints to discourage securities fraud among issuers in an end 
period apply equally to gatekeepers in an end period. 
If a particular gatekeeper is more certain to be repeat player than the 
issuer, the gatekeeper can “rent” its reputation to the issuer. Gatekeepers will 
have less of an incentive to engage in fraud if they are more likely to be 
repeat players or if they are less likely to be in or near an end period. 
Although this argument has intuitive appeal, it is unclear whether 
gatekeepers’ frequency of play is sufficiently greater than that of issuers to 
matter to investors. To the extent that an investor perceives a gatekeeper’s 
credit quality as being lower than that of the issuer (which might occur even 
if the gatekeeper is a more frequent financial market participant than the 
issuer), the gatekeeper might face a more costly end period discount than the 
issuer. Nevertheless, it seems true that by their nature, gatekeepers are likely 
to have more frequent contact with financial markets than issuers.  
4. Buyers’ Ability to Verify Quality Ex Post 
A fourth (and related) reason is the ability of buyers to verify the quality 
of securities purchased after the consummation of the transaction. 
Gatekeepers might have a comparative advantage over issuers in making 
representations as to the quality of securities. Gatekeepers interact with 
numerous issuers and are skilled in complex valuation techniques. Therefore, 
gatekeepers might add value by providing ex ante representations about the 
quality (i.e., value) of securities. Both issuers and investors might benefit 
from these ex ante representations. 
In general, reputation is most valuable when buyers cannot verify the 
quality of goods before they purchase them. However, the value of reputation 
ultimately is established only ex post when buyers verify the quality of goods 
they have purchased in order to confirm or deny the veracity of the seller’s 
initial representations. To the extent a seller disappoints buyers, buyers will 
 
 
 25. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 620 (“The gains from opportunism may well 
exceed the costs of lost reputation.”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p491 Partnoy.doc  12/20/2001   9:12 AM 
 
 
 
 
 
502 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 79:491 
 
 
 
 
discount the value of that seller’s reputation and the seller will not be able to 
charge as high a price in subsequent transactions. To the extent all sellers 
disappoint buyers, buyers will discount all reputations and the market will 
unravel. 
This argument breaks down, however, if buyers cannot verify the quality 
of a product ex post. If buyers are unable to verify the quality of a product 
before or after purchase, sellers will have an incentive to reduce the quality 
of the product or increase its price (i.e., to “milk” their reputations). In 
securities markets, buyers typically are not able to verify with any great 
accuracy the quality of securities after purchase because their only proxy for 
quality is the price of the securities, and numerous variables influence price, 
including random chance. In some circumstances, buyers are able to obtain a 
reasonable proxy during a short time period. For example, buyers of an initial 
public offering (IPO) can observe the difference between the price they paid 
and the value of the stock soon after the offering. If the stock drops in price, 
investors assume the seller has misrepresented the value of the stock. 
Accordingly, sellers and gatekeepers undertake tremendous efforts to ensure 
that IPOs do not go down in price soon after offering. Nevertheless, even if 
buyers have plausible arguments that some IPOs are mispriced, in general, it 
is difficult for a buyer to argue ex post that a gatekeeper’s representations 
relating to the quality or value of securities were inaccurate.26 
As a consequence, buyers of securities tend to focus not on verifying the 
quality or value of the securities themselves, but instead on verifying the 
quality of disclosure related to the securities.27 To the extent investors focus 
on disclosure rather than value, the comparative advantage of gatekeepers is 
reduced. Gatekeepers should not necessarily be superior to issuers (or other 
third parties) in their ability to describe material facts about a securities 
issue.28 
As with issuer representations, investors may not be able to verify the 
accuracy of individual gatekeeper representations in a particular disclosure. If 
such verification is prohibitively expensive, investors will make some 
estimate about the expected accuracy of gatekeepers in the market overall 
and apply that estimate to the individual instance. In such circumstances, 
individual gatekeepers will have an incentive to overstate the value of issues 
 
 
 26. If investors could easily make such representations, there would not be much controversy 
surrounding the filing of securities fraud suits. 
 27. The quality or value of the securities remains important because it sets the amount of 
damages.  
 28. Of course lawyers should have superior abilities in this area, but they typically do not certify 
the accuracy of such material facts. See infra Part III.C.3. 
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more than the average, and the market for gatekeeper certification will 
unravel. 
Thus, the argument about the value of gatekeepers depends on whether it 
is more difficult for investors to verify the accuracy of issuer disclosure ex 
post than it is for investors to verify the accuracy of gatekeeper certification 
of such disclosure ex post. Like issuers, gatekeepers will have an incentive to 
deplete their reputational capital if investors cannot verify ex post that the 
gatekeeper has performed its function in an adequate and honest manner. If 
investors cannot objectively value issuer representations or if it is costly for 
issuers to persuade buyers that such representations are accurate, gatekeepers 
might add value. On the other hand, if investors cannot objectively value 
gatekeeper representations, or if it is costly for gatekeepers to persuade 
buyers that such representations are accurate, gatekeepers will face the same 
difficulties as issuers.  
Accordingly gatekeepers are most valuable when it is substantially less 
costly for them to persuade investors of the veracity of representations than it 
is for issuers to do so. As investors’ perception of issuers improves, the value 
of certification declines.29 Accordingly, gatekeepers are more valuable in 
markets where investors perceive that issuers are of lower quality. 
Paradoxically, in a market where issuers are of high quality (and where 
gatekeeper certification arguably is less necessary), there will be little 
difference between certified and noncertified issuers, and therefore 
gatekeepers will have an incentive to overstate the quality of the issues. The 
more difficult it is to discern the quality of issuer ex post, the greater are the 
incentives for gatekeepers to engage in reputation-depleting activities. 
5. Information Costs 
A fifth issue involves information costs generally. The value of the 
gatekeeper function depends greatly on the information cost structure of an 
economy.30 On one hand, high information costs do not create strong capital 
market mechanisms, and therefore, the argument goes, it may be necessary to 
impose a regulatory regime encouraging gatekeepers to provide information 
 
 
 29. See Choi, supra note 1, at 931. 
 30. Information costs include: (1) costs of acquisition, (2) costs of processing, and (3) costs of 
verification. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 594. Verification costs might include hiring a 
third party expert to evaluate information or the costs of direct investigation. Id. at 603. It is difficult 
and costly to assure the value of purchased information. See Jack Hirschleifer, The Private and Social 
Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 561 (1971); Oliver E. 
Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 
233, 234 n.3 (1979). 
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about securities.31 On the other hand, as information costs decline, the 
financial markets will perform many of these functions on their own. Thus, 
variation in the cost structure of information in particular segments of an 
economy supports the existence of differential regulatory regimes based on 
the sophistication of participants and on the amount and quality of 
information likely to be reflected in securities prices. As information costs 
decline, the importance of the role of gatekeepers (and reputational and legal 
constraints on gatekeepers) also should decline. 
6. Free Riding 
A sixth issue addresses the problem that, absent a regulatory solution, 
gatekeepers might face a free-rider problem in adopting standards to govern 
their own conduct. One way to approach the question of the role of 
gatekeepers is to ask why private contracting alone has failed to establish a 
level of adequate constraints on gatekeepers. One reason might be that any 
gatekeeper who initially attempted to devise an appropriate constraint (for 
example, a contractually specified level of due diligence defense) would face 
great uncertainty. It would need to incur the initial costs associated with 
persuading investors, either through repeated interactions or through 
litigation that upheld its defense, of the viability and boundaries of the 
contractual terms. Once the constraint was established, other gatekeepers 
would be able to use the terms at very low cost. Initially, no gatekeeper 
would have an adequate incentive to include such terms.32 
7. The Term Structure of Interest Rates 
Finally, the term structure of interest rates and the gatekeepers’ cost of 
capital are relevant to the question of whether gatekeeper constraints are 
necessary or effective. Legal scholars do not appear to have considered the 
fact that any cost-benefit calculus by issuers, gatekeepers, and investors, 
assuming that they make such a calculus, is intertemporal, and therefore 
necessarily involves questions about the levels of interest rates and costs of 
 
 
 31. Gilson and Kraakman have stated: 
High information costs, then, lead to a narrow distribution of fully understood and verified 
information, a comparatively ineffective set of capital market mechanisms, and market prices that 
remain in the inefficient range of the relative efficiency continuum. If information costs are high 
enough, the issuer might not realize any return on its investment in developing a better security, 
and market inefficiency would operate as a complete barrier to innovation. 
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 616.  
 32. This argument disfavors Stephen Choi’s proposal that gatekeepers privately establish 
individualized levels of due diligence defense. See Choi, supra note 1, at 919. 
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capital of relevant parties. For example, because gatekeepers certifying an 
issue are balancing short-term gains against longer-term losses, interest rates 
generally and the gatekeepers’ costs of capital more specifically will play an 
important role in the calculus. In a high interest rate environment (or with a 
steep yield curve), gatekeepers will discount future losses more, and 
therefore will be more likely to engage in overstating the value of an issue. In 
a low interest rate environment (or with an inverted yield curve), gatekeepers 
will discount future losses less and therefore will be less likely to engage in 
such overstatement. These differential judgments based on interest rates will 
not affect social welfare if gatekeepers and investors (i.e., society generally) 
face the same cost of capital rate structure. However, to the extent 
gatekeepers have a higher cost of capital, they will discount future costs 
more. The result with respect to the cost of capital is indeterminate, although 
it is possible gatekeepers would choose to engage in reputation-depleting 
activities if they faced a high long-term cost of capital, perhaps because of 
high debt levels or risk associated with other business lines.33 
The point of this section has been to set forth some of the nuances of the 
argument that gatekeepers can act as viable reputational intermediaries. The 
argument is complex and depends on numerous factors comparing issuers 
and gatekeepers, some of which legal scholars have, unfortunately, not taken 
very seriously. 
III. OF REPUTATIONAL CAPITAL, REGULATORY COSTS, AND 
REGULATORY LICENSES 
Notwithstanding the above caveats, the reputational intermediary 
arguments (to which this Article collectively refers as the “reputational 
capital view”) have persuaded numerous legal scholars. The persuasive 
power of reputation intermediary arguments derives not only from the 
theoretical arguments assessed in Part II but also from certain assertions 
about empirical support. However, there is not factual support for many of 
those assertions.  
This Part addresses some of these assertions about empirical support and 
describes evidence supporting an alternative view: the success of some 
gatekeepers derives, at least in part, from the existence of certain direct and 
indirect regulatory costs, as well as from legal rules (such as regulatory 
licenses) granting those gatekeepers valuable property rights independent of 
their investment in reputational capital. Most importantly, gatekeepers 
 
 
 33. For example, in a world where investment banks are highly leveraged, a high cost of capital 
would reduce the present value cost of future reputational losses. 
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benefit to some extent from the direct and indirect effects of legal rules, and 
it is not immediately obvious how those benefits compare to the benefits 
associated with preserving reputational capital. 
A. Two Asserted Paradigmatic Cases  
In describing their view of reputational intermediaries in their leading 
article on financial markets, information, and reputation, Gilson and 
Kraakman assert that: “[e]xamples of such specialists in the products market 
are the Underwriter’s Laboratory and the Good Housekeeping Seal; in the 
financial markets, the most obvious example is the role played by rating 
agencies such as Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s.”34 Moreover, they state 
that the paradigmatic cases of Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. (UL) and bond 
credit rating agencies closely resemble the role of financial market 
gatekeepers who “[r]ather than demonstrating confidence in the accuracy of 
the seller’s information by staking their reputation on it, [instead] . . . signal 
their belief by purchasing the seller’s offering for their own account, thereby 
staking their future directly on the accuracy of the seller’s information.”35 
Many legal academics have followed the assertions of Gilson and 
Kraakman that UL and the bond credit rating agencies serve as two 
paradigmatic examples of the reputational capital view.36 In reality, neither of 
these examples supports the view. Instead, in each case, the private certifier 
has survived and prospered over an extended period of time, not exclusively 
because of its investment in reputational capital as a provider of accurate and 
reliable certification, but also to an important extent because extensive 
regulations have subsidized the provision of certification-related services. 
1. Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. (UL) 
Legal scholars have cited UL as supporting the reputational capital view, 
apparently based on a generalized understanding that consumers rely on UL 
as an effective, third party monitor of the quality of consumer products.37 
There is a tendency to think of UL as similar to Consumer Reports a purely 
private certifier. 
Unfortunately, abundant empirical evidence shows that UL is an 
 
 
 34. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 604-05. 
 35. Id. at 605 (emphasis in original). 
 36. See Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the 
Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 633-34 n.62, 685-86 (1999). 
 37. See, e.g., Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 604-05; Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 
1, at 93-94. 
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especially poor example of a private gatekeeper. This evidence shows that 
UL has not survived and prospered during the last century exclusively 
because of its reputation for quality; instead, it has derived great value from 
monopoly property rights based on regulatory requirements and preferences 
related to UL labels.38 
Initially, UL was a purely private market gatekeeper and provider of 
(hopefully accurate) information of consumer products. Several insurance 
companies established UL in November 1901 to undertake uniform testing of 
appliances and other consumer products, and thereby provide important and 
valuable information.39 These tests were designed to generate credible 
information about hazards associated with the tested products, and UL began 
providing labels to help consumers distinguish easily between approved and 
disapproved products. The labels caught on, and by the early 1920s 
consumers were relying extensively on both tests and labels. Companies 
even began developing products with a view to secure UL’s certification.40 
At this point in time, legal academics indeed would have been correct to rely 
on UL as a paradigmatic example of the reputational capital view: UL was a 
nonprofit corporation, not supported by regulation, it did not favor particular 
manufacturers, and it was able to provide valuable information and credible 
certification of consumer products.41 At this time, UL survived and prospered 
based on a well-deserved reputation for quality. 
The modern UL is a very different story. UL has become a giant in 
certification, with 3,900 employees. UL tests 75,000 products and UL marks 
appear on more than sixteen billion new products each year.42 The key factor 
in the dramatic success and growth of UL in recent decades has been the 
introduction of numerous legal rules (i.e., regulatory licenses) that depend 
explicitly on the UL label.  
UL is specifically mentioned as the basis for regulation in more than one 
hundred provisions in the Code of Federal Regulations, ranging from 
agriculture to consumer products to energy to shipping.43 In other words, 
 
 
 38. See Partnoy, supra note 36, at 685-86. 
 39. See Harry Chase Brearly, A Symbol of Safety: The Origins of Underwriters Laboratories, in 
REPUTATION: STUDIES IN THE VOLUNTARY ELICITATION OF GOOD CONDUCT 75, 77-79 (Daniel B. 
Klein ed., 1997). 
 40. See Partnoy, supra note 36, at 685 n.313.  
 41. As Harry Brearly noted, “As a result, the labels of Underwriters’ Laboratories mean 
something. They are recognized as incontrovertible evidence that the goods which bear them really 
possess the qualities of their rating.” Brearly, supra note 39, at 83. 
 42. See Daniel B. Klein, Trust for Hire: Voluntary Remedies for Quality and Safety, in 
REPUTATION: STUDIES IN THE VOLUNTARY ELICITATION OF GOOD CONDUCT, supra note 39, at 97, 
114-15. See also UL Homepage, at http://www.ul.com (last visited Aug. 10, 2001). 
 43. To come to the conclusion, I searched the Lexis-Nexus Code of Federal Regulations database 
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more than one hundred legal rules depend on whether and how UL has 
certified a particular product. This dependence creates valuable regulatory 
licenses for UL; product manufacturers must obtain the UL seal to capture 
the benefits associated with these legal rules. For example, the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has specified UL as an authorized 
independent certification organization for the purposes of satisfying certain 
OSHA procedures.44 One scholar has described the UL-based regulations as 
resulting in an “OSHA monopoly” for UL.45  
To clarify, the argument is not that UL labels necessarily are inaccurate; 
instead, it is that UL’s dominance is only partially sustained by its reputation 
for quality certification. Anyone doubting this should simply type 
“Underwriters Laboratories” into any legal database search of federal 
regulations to see the vast array of rules that depend explicitly on UL 
certification. Simply put, UL is not an ideal reputational intermediary. Even 
for scholars who reject the proposals made in this Article, it is my more 
limited hope to persuade them to stop citing UL as a certification entity that 
prospers in private markets based solely on its reputation. That reputational 
capital story is simply not true. 
 2. Bond Credit Rating Agencies 
If UL is a poor example, what about bond credit rating agencies? Are 
Standard & Poor (S&P) and Moody’s, which control ninety percent of the 
U.S. credit ratings market,46 ideal reputational intermediaries? Legal scholars 
have placed great faith in bond credit rating agencies as a paradigmatic 
example of the reputational capital view. 
For example, in a 1998 article, Choi began his discussion of market 
defects and legal intervention by asserting that: “[i]n many markets, 
intermediaries play a certification role without any regulatory intervention. 
Standard & Poor’s (“S&P”) and Moody’s, for example, certify the credit risk 
of company debt.”47 After discussing several reasons why S&P and Moody’s 
might have such large market shares (for example, ninety percent), Choi 
concluded that: “the most compelling justification for the high market 
concentration in the debt rating market lies with the need for Moody’s and 
 
 
on Jan. 31, 2001. 
 44. See Partnoy, supra note 36, at 686 (describing such regulations). 
 45. In fact, the market power derived from these regulations was a duopoly, not monopoly, 
because they authorized certifications from both UL and the Factory Mutual Research Corporation 
(FMRC). See Klein, supra note 42, at 115 n.32. 
 46. See Partnoy, supra note 36, at 649-50. 
 47. Choi, supra note 1, at 934 (emphasis added). 
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S&P to develop strong reputations for screening accuracy, quality, and 
fidelity.”48 Numerous other academics have made this point about credit 
rating agencies,49 although more recently a few scholars have noted that the 
assumptions about credit rating agencies might not be accurate.50 
As with UL, extensive empirical evidence suggests that the credit rating 
agency story does not support the reputational capital view. Hundreds of 
legal rules depend substantively on certification by credit rating agencies.51 
Although the regulatory dependence on credit ratings is not as direct as the 
dependence on UL, the statutes and regulations refer to Nationally 
Recognized Statistical Ratings Organizations (NRSROs), which effectively 
include just Moody’s, S&P, and one other agency. Unlike the UL-based 
regulations, the ratings-related regulations do not specifically name the 
relevant rating agencies.52 Nevertheless, the rating agencies benefit indirectly 
from this grant of valuable regulatory licenses.  
Because of the wide range of regulation that depends substantively on 
specified credit ratings, the assumption that credit rating agencies have 
survived and prospered based on a reputation for quality simply does not 
hold. Credit ratings and default experience are correlated, but much of that 
correlation is due to after-the-fact adjustments in ratings in response to public 
news. Issuers pay substantial fees to credit ratings agencies because much of 
the value of credit ratings is derived from regulatory licenses, which since the 
1970s increasingly have come to pervade securities, banking, insurance, and 
pension regulation.53  
Once rulemaking began to depend substantively on ratings in 1973, there 
was an avalanche of such ratings-based rules, which quickly spread to other 
substantive areas. After several decades of this practice, the rating agencies 
 
 
 48. Id. at 961. 
 49. See, e.g., Yakov Amihud et al., A New Governance Structure for Corporate Bonds, 51 STAN. 
L. REV. 447, 481 (1999) (“Bond rating agencies such as Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s perform 
their tasks diligently without such compensation. The economic interest of the rating agencies in 
preserving their reputations suffices as an incentive for diligent service.”). See also Partnoy, supra note 
36, at 633-34 n.62 (quoting from several examples). 
 50. See Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities 
Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2001), available in Social Science Research, at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=182169; Lawrence White, The Industrial Organization of 
the Global Ratings Business (2001) (working paper, on file with author). Regulators also have noticed 
problems associated with regulatory dependence on credit ratings. See FDIC Regional Directors 
Memorandum re: Examination Treatment for Certain Types of Credit-Linked Notes, at 
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/ 2000/fil0088a.html (Dec. 13, 2000). 
 51. See Partnoy, supra note 36, at 690-703. 
 52. See id. at 690 n.341. 
 53. It also is worth noting that in 1982 credit rating agencies were excluded from § 11(a)(4) and, 
therefore, were insulated from § 11 liability. JENNINGS ET AL., supra note 15, at 918. 
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have a concentrated and powerful interest in maintaining these rules, whereas 
investors, who might lobby for eliminating regulatory dependence, are 
diffuse and relatively powerless. Consequently, reform proposals that do not 
address the regulatory dependence on ratings are unlikely to change the 
structural problems in the fixed income industry. For example, Choi’s 
assertion that his proposal for self-tailored liability “may offer small 
competitors a means of entering the debt rating market”54 seems unlikely to 
be proven correct. 
Several themes emerge from the examples of UL and credit rating 
agencies. First, it is dangerous to rely on assertions that third party certifiers 
can serve as effective private market gatekeepers. Second, the fact that a third 
party certifier survives and prospers over time is not necessarily an indication 
that it is fulfilling a valuable private gatekeeping function. Instead, the 
certifier may simply be profiting from property rights granted to it by virtue 
of legal rules or regulation. Third, when discussing the reputation of 
certifiers, scholars should include an analysis of the effects of legal rules that 
depend on certifiers. To the extent overall costs of such rules exceed their 
benefits, scholars should begin to consider alternative regimes. Finally, there 
is a range of possible regulatory dependence on gatekeepers and, therefore, a 
range of importance of regulatory licenses. At one extreme is a pure 
government rater, such as the United States Department of Agriculture, 
which rates beef, for example. At the other extreme is a purely private rater, 
such as Consumer Reports, which rates consumer products. 
 
Pure Gov’t Rater   Pure Private Rater
USDA UL Moody’s/S&P Consumer Reports
 
The main question with respect to any third party certifier is: where does 
it fall along this continuum? The next section considers this question with 
respect to financial market gatekeepers. 
B. Securities Regulation and the Proliferation of Regulatory Licenses  
If many legal scholars misunderstood the role of reputation for UL and 
the bond credit rating agencies, it is also possible that they also 
misunderstood the role of reputation for investment banking, accounting, and 
law firms. Are these financial market gatekeepers similar to UL or Moody’s, 
or are they more like purely private third party certifiers? Do regulations 
 
 
 54. Choi, supra note 1, at 961. 
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exist granting these gatekeepers valuable property rights, enabling them to 
profit even if they are not playing an optimal private third party certification 
role?  
This section addresses these questions and offers some preliminary 
answers. A complete answer to these questions will require a great deal more 
study, thought, and empirical research. Nevertheless, it is worth noting now 
that some legal scholars’ almost wholesale acceptance of assertions related to 
the reputational capital view as it applies to financial market gatekeepers that 
is eerily similar to legal scholars’ acceptance of similar assertions as applied 
to UL and credit rating agencies.  
Moreover, although there is little evidence of any systematic bias towards 
fraud at more prestigious gatekeeping institutions, the perpetrators of most 
major securities frauds since the 1960s have employed top gatekeeping 
firms.55 Even if most gatekeepers fall into a middle region, where they might 
or might not engage in reputation-depleting activities based on their 
assessment of the expected costs and benefits of such activities,56 it is worth 
considering the extent to which some of those benefits might stem from 
regulatory licenses. 
An alternative view is that securities regulation has created profit 
opportunities for and protected the upper echelons of gatekeepers, including 
investment banking, accounting, and law firms. Some of these protections 
seem to have been by design; others seem to have been inadvertent. 
Collectively, these protections have generated direct and indirect regulatory 
costs, as well as regulatory licenses, which, although costly, do not appear to 
be as costly as the regulatory licenses created by regulations that depend 
substantively on UL symbols or bond credit ratings. Gatekeepers are most 
likely somewhere between Moody’s/S&P and Consumer Reports on the 
continuum. My modest goal in the discussion to follow is to persuade 
scholars that gatekeepers benefit at least somewhat from securities-related 
regulatory costs and regulatory licenses.57 
The analysis begins with the well-known “due diligence” defense. In 
theory, a “reasonableness” or “due diligence” standard for gatekeepers would 
result in optimal deterrence. Faced with a rule requiring them to engage in 
reasonable monitoring of issuers or to satisfy a due diligence requirement, 
 
 
 55. See Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 1, at 68 n.46. 
 56. Id. at 69-70. 
 57. Put another way, there are two parts to the argument about gatekeepers and the cost structure 
of the industry. The first relates generally to direct and indirect regulatory costs and does not depend 
on the existence of regulatory licenses. The second relates to the regulatory license theory described 
supra Part III.A. 
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gatekeepers would engage in whatever monitoring activities would minimize 
their net expected liability costs. Put another way, gatekeepers would expend 
resources to engage in monitoring of issuers to the extent the marginal cost of 
those expenditures was less than the expected marginal gain in terms of 
liability.58 
However, what makes sense in theory, does not hold true in practice. In 
applying due diligence-related standards, courts and regulators inevitably err 
in specifying the optimal level of gatekeeper monitoring and, more 
importantly, in adjudicating disputes about whether gatekeepers engaged in 
adequate monitoring. These errors are magnified when the gatekeeper 
activity is complex (as it increasingly is, given rapidly evolving financial 
technologies) and when the law is ambiguous (as it increasingly is, given the 
dearth of reported and relevant gatekeeper cases).59  
For example, liability for securities fraud has generated concerns about 
the large number of allegedly frivolous lawsuits. Regardless of one’s position 
as to the whether securities litigation generally is frivolous or meritorious, it 
is undeniable that such suits are very costly to resolve.60 The costs of 
resolving these disputes are imposed, at least in part, on gatekeepers.  
Gatekeepers are able to pass on a portion of the costs of these suits to 
issuers, investors, and, to some extent, insurers.61 To the extent gatekeepers 
are able to pass these costs along, there are few nonreputational incentive 
effects imposed on gatekeepers to act in a police role insuring that issuers 
avoid committing securities fraud.62 To the extent gatekeepers are unable to 
pass these costs along, the costs make the gatekeepers’ role more expensive 
and uncertain and are a barrier to entering the gatekeeper industry. 
Although individual gatekeepers complain about particular securities 
fraud lawsuits, gatekeepers overall (especially those with the most substantial 
investments in reputational capital) arguably benefit from the complexity of 
 
 
 58. This analysis assumes gatekeepers are risk-neutral with respect to liability. If gatekeepers are 
risk-averse, they might expend additional resources to engage in monitoring to avoid liability.   
 59. See Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 1, at 76. 
 60. Kraakman made this point in his initial proposal. See Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 1, 
at 75 (stating that “courts are not necessarily adept at evaluating gatekeeping efforts ex post”). 
 61. Although insurance against securities fraud generally is not available to gatekeepers in the 
United States, gatekeepers frequently engage in insurance pooling and may nevertheless find methods 
of purchasing third party insurance. For example, the “Big 5” accounting firms and many “top” law 
firms enter into pooling agreements in which they agree to insure each other’s liability for very large 
damage awards. Such pooling agreements also benefit elite firms by preventing each firm from playing 
a role against any firm that is a member of the pooling agreement in any dispute covered by the 
agreement. In addition, insurance policies that would be void on public policy grounds in the United 
States could be purchased in other jurisdictions. 
 62. Moreover, to the extent only the most reputable gatekeepers can pass these costs along, the 
potential for liability creates incentives for a more concentrated market structure.  
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securities litigation. The best evidence of this benefit is that gatekeepers 
(through professional organizations) have been closely involved in 
developing a set of evolving standards to describe some of the open-ended 
elements of securities regulation, including the due diligence defense. For 
example, lawyers and accountants have specified minimum standards for 
audit procedures and legal opinions that would satisfy the due diligence 
defense.63 Consequently, gatekeepers must go through the fifty or so discrete 
steps necessary to meet these minimum standards or else suffer the risk of 
losing their due diligence defense.64 Gatekeepers must follow these 
procedures to obtain a due diligence benefit regardless of whether they 
otherwise would choose to follow those procedures. At least to some extent, 
these costs are passed on to investors who pay a higher cost of capital overall 
as a result. 
Given that securities regulation as applied to gatekeepers is based on a 
substantive review of the gatekeeper’s role (for example, the due diligence 
defense), courts are forced into a delicate balancing act. An overly harsh 
liability regime penalizes gatekeepers for misconduct they could not detect, 
while an overly lenient liability regime insufficiently deters misconduct. The 
uncertainty associated with litigating these issues is very costly. The most 
prominent examples of this uncertainty are the liability regimes and available 
defenses associated with claims against gatekeepers based on violations of 
§§ 11 and 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act and of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the 
1934 Act. Part III.C will discuss these statutory claims in greater detail as 
they apply to individual gatekeepers. The following discussion is intended to 
outline some of the issues arising under each statute. 
Section 11 of the 1933 Act65 generates a range of regulatory costs that 
benefit top-tier gatekeepers. Section 11 imposes strict liability on issuers for 
any misstatement in a registration statement filed with the SEC66 and 
imposes liability on other persons associated with an offering, including the 
relevant gatekeepers, but also allows those parties a due diligence defense.67 
The “expert” parties entitled to the due diligence defense include 
accountants, engineers, appraisers, or any other person “whose profession 
 
 
 63. See Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 1, at 80, 83. 
 64. Id. at 83 (noting that “for a sophisticated lawyer, much of it [the due diligence ‘checklist’] is 
almost as operational as the bouncer’s duty to check the identification of underage patrons”). 
 65. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994 & Supp. 1997). 
 66. See id. § 77k(a). 
 67. Section 11 also limits the damages to be paid by gatekeepers to the difference between the 
offering price and the subsequent price in the market and allows the gatekeepers to interpose a defense 
that the decline in market value was caused by some factor other than the misstatement. Id. § 77k. 
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gives authority to a statement made by him.”68 Under § 11, these experts may 
escape liability by showing that, after reasonable investigation, they had 
reasonable grounds to believe that the materially misleading statements were 
in fact true.69 
Because the § 11 due diligence defense is so vague and imprecise, and 
because there is little case law and only a few pointers from the SEC,70 
parties can have little faith that they are entitled to the due diligence defense 
unless they satisfy all of the minimum standards specified by industry, 
courts, and regulators. Thus, the due diligence requirements force 
gatekeepers to engage in liability-avoiding procedures they otherwise might 
avoid and that might not be of value to investors or issuers. Instead, 
gatekeepers must follow these procedures to avoid liability for fraudulent 
issues or to insure that other parties receive the protections associated with 
reasonable reliance on gatekeepers (for example, an underwriter relying on 
underwriter’s counsel or a director relying on the opinion of an accounting 
firm or investment bank). 
The case of Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp.71 is a good example of 
statutory and judicial creation of regulatory costs in the context of § 11. By 
imposing liability on parties for failing to engage in particular specified 
practices, this case created new minimum standards for gatekeepers. Any 
gatekeeper seeking to avoid legal liability who reads BarChris would be 
foolish not to engage in the minimum level of monitoring practice the court 
intimated would satisfy the due diligence requirements. Alternatively, any 
gatekeeper would be similarly foolish to engage only in the same level of 
care as the gatekeepers did in that case. By enshrining a particular standard 
within a legal opinion, the court created a valuable property right in 
gatekeepers: issuers who did not hire gatekeepers satisfying these minimum 
standards would be forced to pass on to their investors a higher expected cost 
of liability and, therefore, would face a higher cost of capital. Accordingly, 
issuers could reduce their cost of capital by hiring gatekeepers who would 
satisfy the requirements articulated in the opinion, even if those requirements 
would not otherwise have been economically rational for the gatekeepers. 
At least some gatekeepers, particularly those gatekeepers with the greatest 
investment in reputational capital, benefit from these open-ended standards, 
 
 
 68. Id.  § 77k(a)(4). 
 69. See id. § 77k(f). Different standards apply to the expertised and nonexpertised portions of the 
registration statement with respect to a particular gatekeeper. 
 70. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.176 (1999) (rule setting forth levels of due diligence requirements); 
Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 1, at 83 n.87 (stating that Rule 176 is “too general to provide 
much real guidance”). 
 71. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
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and the resulting regulatory costs. It is difficult to argue that gatekeepers 
lobbied for these standards in the same way private parties in other areas 
have “captured” regulators, especially in the context of an individual judicial 
decision. Nevertheless, the top gatekeepers have approved of these rules ex 
post by acquiescing to the due diligence defenses of § 11; in fact, certain 
gatekeepers, including top underwriters and securities lawyers, even have 
played an active role in articulating the boundaries of the defenses.72 
Like § 11, § 12(a)(2) imposes negligence liability on issuers and 
gatekeepers selling a security using a prospectus (or oral statement) that is 
false or misleading, and, like § 11, § 12(a)(2) provides a limited affirmative 
defense.73 In simple terms, gatekeepers face liability unless they can show 
their conduct was reasonable and not merely without recklessness or intent. 
Thus, § 12(a)(2) creates a defense of reasonable investigation similar to the 
due diligence defense of § 11. 
Notwithstanding some recent limitations on the scope of § 12(a)(2),74 
investors persistently have sought to establish liability against gatekeepers 
(attorneys and accountants in particular) under § 12 because the provision 
can be viewed as imposing strict liability on anyone violating it as a “seller.” 
For example, an attorney who prepares false or misleading documents in 
connection with the sale of a new securities offering will be subject to 
liability under § 12, and the availability of a reasonable defense will turn on 
an analysis of whether the attorney was a “seller” under Section 12. The 
attorney may or may not be provided statutory defenses similar to those 
provided under § 11. Obviously, investors have a great interest in 
establishing that a gatekeeper played the role of “seller” in a particular 
transaction, and it is a frenquently litigated and difficult question whether a 
particular gatekeeper has “seller” status by virtue of its participation in the 
registration and sales processes.75 
Although the standards for liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the 
1934 Act are even murkier, there is an argument that these standards also 
 
 
 72. See Choi, supra note 1, at 949 (noting that in influencing the due diligence rules the 
securities bar and underwriters “bring a desire to maximize their importance and role in securities 
offerings”); Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 1, at 83. 
 73. 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2). 
 74. In particular, in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995), the Supreme Court interpreted 
§ 12(a)(2) to apply only to misrepresentations in public offerings, thereby removing private offerings 
from the scope of § 12(a)(2). 
 75. Legal academics have noted the complexity of these issues. For example, Therese Maynard 
has noted that complications similar to those raised by the due diligence defense of § 11 also arise 
under the reasonable care defense of § 12(a)(2). See Therese H. Maynard, The Affirmative Defense of 
Reasonable Care Under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57 
(1993). 
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create regulatory costs of the type created by § 11. Rule 10b-5 provides 
remedies and creates defenses for any buyer or seller of securities who 
proves the following elements: (1) a misstatement or an omission, (2) of 
material fact, (3) made with scienter, (4) on which the plaintiff relied, and (5) 
that proximately caused his injury. Gatekeepers frequently are sued based on 
Rule 10b-5, and are most successful in defending those claims by attacking 
the first and third elements. Of these two, scienter is often the most difficult 
for a plaintiff to establish.76  
Federal courts generally have held that the scienter requirement is 
satisfied by proof of recklessness or an extreme departure from the applicable 
standard of care.77 Michael Dooley’s comments on the Rule 10b-5 scienter 
requirement were as true in the 1970s as they are today: it is “one of the most 
elastic concepts devised by the common law.”78 The requirement and its 
defenses make liability risks highly unpredictable.79 As with the §§ 11 and 
12(a)(2) defenses, this unpredictability benefits gatekeepers by generating 
indirect regulatory costs. Investors will only benefit from any passed-along 
reduction in issuer costs to the extent gatekeepers being used for a particular 
issue have taken adequate precautions to minimize their expected liability 
under Rule 10b-5. 
This section has focused on those regulatory costs created by securities 
regulation as it relates to litigation risk.80 The high costs of evaluating 
securities litigation ex post based on current securities law standards create 
valuable property rights in regulatory licenses that gatekeepers otherwise 
would not enjoy. The next section lists some representative sources of other 
regulatory licenses: the provisions of the securities laws, regulations, and 
rules that might benefit gatekeepers by enabling them to profit from some 
legal requirement.  
 
 
 76. See David J. Beck, Legal Malpractice in Texas, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 761, 794 (1998). 
 77. See Hillary A. Sale, Disappearing Without a Trace: Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the 1933 
Securities Act, 75 WASH. L. REV. 429, 438-39 (2000).  
 78. Dooley, supra note 1, at 814. 
 79. See Dooley, supra note 1, at 822. In some circumstances, especially where deterrence is a 
primary objective and cannot otherwise be accomplished, such unpredictability or uncertainty can 
benefit society. Regulation of financial markets can be such an area, especially when it will be 
impossible to deter damaging behavior in any other way. See Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives 
and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J. CORP. L. 211, 246-54 (1997) (discussing potential 
benefits of uncertain regulation in the financial derivatives industry). 
 80. Arguably, the effects of these regulatory costs are not as direct or extreme as the effects of 
regulatory licenses generated by rules that depend directly on third party behavior. 
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C. The Role of the Major Financial Market Gatekeepers  
This section considers some specific evidence and arguments with respect 
to each of the three major financial market gatekeepers—investment banks, 
accounting firms, and law firms—supporting the view that securities 
regulation has created regulatory costs and regulatory licenses that convey 
benefits to some of these gatekeepers. The evidence does not support the 
extreme situation of UL or even the indirect regulatory licenses associated 
with bond credit ratings, and this Article should not be interpreted to assert 
any such argument. However, there are some direct and indirect regulatory 
costs, and in certain instances, particularly for accounting firms, explicit and 
implicit regulatory licenses. Scholars should consider the existence and 
effects of regulatory costs and regulatory licenses, to the extent they exist. 
1. Investment Banking Firms  
Issuers, and therefore investors, benefit from underwriters in numerous 
ways entirely unrelated to regulation. Underwriters (i.e., investment banking 
firms) serve to some extent as reputational intermediaries, underwriters have 
expertise and can advise issuers regarding the potential market for an 
offering, underwriters provide some insurance that the financial markets will 
absorb an offering, and underwriters commit to stabilize an offering after the 
issue is first purchased by investors.  
John Coffee has described two alternative conceptions of the role of the 
securities regulation as applied to underwriters. According to one view, 
securities regulation acts as a “lever by which to increase corporate 
efficiency.”81 The underwriter disciplines management, improves corporate 
accountability, and makes securities pricing more accurate. This view is 
increasingly the focus of modern scholarship. As Coffee states: “[B]y its 
association with a securities offering, a high prestige underwriter places its 
‘seal of approval’ on the offering. In ‘law and economics’ shorthand, the 
underwriter pledges its reputational capital and thereby becomes a 
reputational intermediary.”82 
A second conception of the role of securities regulation as applied to 
underwriters assumes that the underwriter can serve a risk-bearing function. 
In the U.S. securities markets, underwriters have come to serve this function 
 
 
 81. John C. Coffee, Jr., Re-Engineering Corporate Disclosure: The Company Debate Over 
Company Registration, 52 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1143, 1169 (1995). 
 82. See Coffee, supra note 81, at 1169. 
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less and less. In general, underwriters do not provide insurance.83 In the 
context of the traditional underwriting function, underwriters typically have 
commitments for their allotments before they buy them and thus bear little 
risk. Nevertheless, the fact that underwriters do not play a risk-bearing or 
insurance function does not mean that they could not in the future. Moreover, 
it seems odd that the underwriter role would be valued so highly if it is 
limited to certifying the integrity of an offering. 
Gilson and Kraakman argue that the role of the investment banker is not 
explained entirely by the dual function of distributing securities for the issuer 
and risk-sharing or insurance in connection with underwriting. They suggest 
a third role of “information and reputation intermediary.”84 The finance 
literature supports this argument that the reputation of investment bankers 
acts to certify securities offerings,85 and legal academics seem to assume that 
investment bankers will suffer negative reputational consequences from 
failing to engage in proper due diligence with respect to securities issues.86 
Gilson and Kraakman argue that viewing the underwriters’ role as that of 
reputational intermediary helps to answer several puzzling questions about 
financial markets. For example, the question of why IPOs are consistently 
underpriced can be explained if the underwriter is investing in its reputation 
by passing on to the buyer a portion of the returns. The explanation seems 
especially perverse given recent concern about investment banks making 
side-payments to customers.87 
Yet these explanations of the role of underwriters are incomplete. For 
example, they do not explain why underwriters have agreed to the web of 
securities regulation applicable to investment banks. Investment banks and 
underwriters have not always faced such regulation. Certainly in the days of 
J.P. Morgan, before the 1933 and 1934 Acts, the underwriting role was 
governed almost entirely by reputational constraints. The regulatory regime 
 
 
 83. See Dooley, supra note 1, at 788. 
 84. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 618, 605 n.161. 
 85. See, e.g., James R. Booth & Richard L. Smith, II, Capital Raising, Underwriting and the 
Certification Hypothesis, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 261 (1986) (discussing certification function in the context 
of IPOs).  
 86. See, e.g., Gulati, supra note 12, at 710 (“Further, the intermediaries such as underwriters and 
lawyers are subject to both legal liability and reputational costs if they are negligent in their due 
diligence.”). 
 87. “This is, in fact, consistent with the common practice of allocating ‘hot issues’ to one's best 
customers, thereby both insuring that the investors’ overall return will approximate the mean 
regardless of the variance, and nicely limiting the investment in reputation to the most important 
audience.” Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 621-22 n.197; but see eToys Press Release, Milberg 
Weiss Announces Class Action Suit Against eToys, Inc., at http://www.milberg.com/etoys (last visited 
Sept. 29, 2001) (describing complaint filed against underwriters of eToys for making such side 
payments to certain investors in the eToys IPO). 
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of that time was substantially less onerous (in some areas, nonexistent) with a 
mixed effect. As a result, gatekeepers did not greatly benefit from regulatory 
costs or regulatory licenses; in fact, the gatekeeping industry was much 
smaller in terms of revenues and market capitalization. On the other hand, 
evidence of substantial abuse and fraud involving gatekeepers arose during 
this period.88 
In any event, following the Great Crash of 1929, blaming underwriters 
became politically popular, and therefore some form of underwriter liability 
seemed inevitable by the early 1930s.89 However, underwriters were not even 
mentioned in the first securities legislation introduced in the 1933 Congress, 
and there were substantial questions about whether underwriters should be 
included at all within § 11.90 
The original version of § 11 created what has been called an 
“astronomical” risk of liability for underwriters.91 Because it was short lived, 
it is impossible to know what its effects would have been. The investment 
banking industry immediately brought pressure to modify portions of § 11, 
such as limitations on damages, shortened statute of limitations, and reliance 
and causation requirements.92 
Ultimately, underwriters, notwithstanding their obvious lobbying power 
and enormous resources, accepted § 11’s imposition of liability. At first 
glance, the acquiescence of underwriters with respect to § 11 seems 
puzzling.93 Even if underwriters were unable to overcome the public’s 
disdain during the 1930s, why would they have continued to accept the 
imposition of liability during more recent decades94 when they have proven 
to be successful in lobbying against financial regulation in other areas?95 
Many possible explanations exist. Underwriters might be satisfied with 
 
 
 88. A complete normative assessment of these phenomena in the pre-1933 regime is well beyond 
the ambition of this Article. 
 89. See Dooley, supra note 1, at 794-95. 
 90. See id. at 793. See generally JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 39-
72 (rev. ed. 1995). 
 91. See Dooley, supra note 1, at 802. 
 92. See id. at 804-05. 
 93. See Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies, supra note 1, at 895-96.  
 94. Underwriters have remained satisfied with § 11 for at least four decades. Michael Dooley has 
asserted that before and during the 1960s underwriters typically decided to underwrite a particular 
issue only after carefully investigating the issuer and evaluating its prospects, but that by the 1970s, 
this was no longer true. See Dooley, supra note 1, at 785. It certainly is not true today. Underwriters 
frequently do not have the time for such careful investigation and evaluation, and many issues do not 
require the same sort of detailed investigation. Moreover, in many instances the costs of investigation 
outweigh the benefits.  
 95. Investment banks have been very effective in lobbying for deregulation of the derivatives 
industry, even at times of significant scandal and public concern about industry practices. See Partnoy, 
supra note 79, at 255-56. 
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§ 11 because its liability provisions have no teeth: they are rarely found liable 
for § 11 damages, and when they are, they are indemnified by issuers.96 
Alternatively, Gilson and Kraakman have argued that investment bankers 
actually need § 11 liability in order to signal quality in a way that could not 
be imitated by a lower quality firm.97 One implication of this argument is that 
costly ex post adjudication of gatekeeper liability based on open ended 
standards gives a few high quality investment bankers market power and acts 
as a powerful barrier to entry.98 To the extent § 11 liability falls more heavily 
on low quality investment banks, high quality investment banks will have an 
interest in the existence and enforcement of such liability provisions. Costly 
liability provisions could operate as an effective barrier to entry for new, less 
reputable firms, which are more likely to be found liable and which, 
therefore, will find it costly to imitate the signals of higher quality investment 
banking firms. 
In fact, the existence of costly ex post adjudication of liability might be a 
plausible alternative explanation of how a few investment banks have 
maintained their collective market share while earning what appear to be 
enormous profits. The bulge bracket of investment banking has been highly 
resistant to change over time. It is plausible, then, that the top investment 
banks have acquired and maintained market power in part because of 
valuable property rights deriving from the possible imposition of liability for 
securities fraud. If so, the normative implications for securities regulation are 
startling. The more vigorously the securities laws are enforced in court, 
particularly against lower quality gatekeepers, the higher the barrier to entry 
in those areas. As securities fraud lawsuits have recently proliferated, the 
increased costs associated with such litigation might have helped to cement 
the investment banks’ role.99 
The explanation offered by Gilson and Kraakman is closely related to the 
regulatory license theory advocated here, that is, that some underwriters 
benefit from regulatory entitlements associated with the securities laws (for 
example, they are able to charge additional fees associated with the 
 
 
 96. To the extent § 11 is effectively irrelevant to underwriters, the modified strict liability 
proposal set forth in this Article (at least to the extent it eliminates due diligence-related defenses) 
would be a reasonable way of changing securities regulation to reflect practice. Under the proposal, 
underwriters could simply choose to fix their liability at a low level. 
 97. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 605-06 n.164. 
 98. See Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 1, at 70. 
 99. In one study, James Bohn and Stephen Choi found contrary evidence based on a relationship 
between the reputation of underwriters and the likelihood of a securities fraud suit. See James Bohn & 
Stephen Choi, Fraud in the New-Issues Market: Empirical Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 144 
U. PA. L. REV. 903 (1996). James Cox, however, has pointed out numerous flaws in this study. See 
James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 497, 506-08 (1997). 
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regulatory benefits from their role). Merritt Fox has noted that the due 
diligence defense has depended on various surrounding circumstances since 
1934,100 and that variation in circumstances is the basis for the uncertainty 
supporting the existence of regulatory costs that benefit top-tier underwriters. 
Can a similar argument be made about regulatory licenses and 
underwriters in other contexts? The securities laws do not require the use of 
an underwriter, and most issuers use one or more underwriters for their 
securities issues. As a result, it is difficult to argue that underwriters play a 
role similar to that of UL. Moreover, evidence exists that as technology 
improves and information costs decline, issuers more frequently choose not 
to use underwriters.101 Although there is no obvious regulatory obstacle to an 
issuer choosing not to use underwriters, few issuers have attempted to do so, 
presumably because they would incur a higher cost of capital without an 
underwriter. 
As noted above, §§ 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act and § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
of the 1934 Act impose liability risk on underwriters.102 In fact, the scienter 
requirement of Rule 10b-5 may actually create a disincentive for 
underwriters to engage in due diligence by making ignorance bliss: 
underwriters who were totally ignorant of a fraud are safe from liability, even 
if they were grossly negligent, whereas underwriters who conduct some 
investigation may have the requisite scienter.103 Where both Rule 10b-5 and 
other liability provisions apply, the disincentive might not exist. But where 
§ 11 liability is not relevant (for example, in private placements), 
underwriters have an incentive to avoid conducting due diligence at all. 
In addition, although Central Bank of Denver N.A. v. First Interstate Bank 
 
 
 100. Merritt B. Fox, Shelf Registration, Integrated Disclosure, and Underwriter Due Diligence: 
An Economic Analysis, 70 VA. L. REV. 1005, 1031 n.81 (1984) (citing legislative history of 1934 
amendment deleting the term “fiduciary relationship” because that term had been “terrifyingly 
portrayed”). 
 101. Several issuers, including municipalities such as the City of Pittsburgh, recently have 
attempted to access the financial markets without the use of an underwriter. 
 102. In another context, Randall Thomas and Robert Hansen have made this argument with great 
force: 
Imposing gatekeeper liability is costly though . . . [because] investment bankers will demand 
compensation for assuming these duties. This demand will penalize innocent clients and 
encourage the entry into the market of low-quality competitors. Investment bankers may also 
refuse to accept high risk cases, precisely the group of firms most in need of their services. It may 
also be easy for management to select investment bankers that are corrupt or willing to assume 
personal liability for a price, although this will be more difficult with diversified investment 
banking firms that have widespread client bases and well-known reputations, and to fire bankers 
that try to stop abuses. 
Randall S. Thomas & Robert G. Hansen, A Theoretic Analysis of Corporate Auctioneers’ Liability 
Regimes, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1147, 1178. 
 103. See Coffee, supra note 81, at 1173 n.85. 
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of Denver N.A.104 limited the application of § 10(b) to gatekeepers based on 
aiding and abetting theories, courts in recent years have held that claims for 
primary § 10(b) violations can be asserted against underwriters merely based 
upon their participation in the issuance of a prospectus.105 For example, in 
Phillips v. Kidder, Peabody & Co.,106 the court noted that in order to subject 
an underwriter to primary § 10(b) liability the underwriter itself must have 
made the statements in the offering documents.107 The Court reasoned that an 
underwriter can make a statement in the offering documents merely by 
drafting or helping to draft the documents for the issuer.108 
Moreover, in a market with rapidly evolving technologies, it is reasonable 
to question whether the underwriter’s “due diligence” role is justified at all. 
Legal scholars debated this issue during the 1980s after the SEC adopted 
Rule 415 for shelf registrations.109 The recent evidence associated with Rule 
415 shows that for shelf registrations, disinterested advance due diligence is 
the exception, not the rule.110 Coffee has noted that “it is costly to structure 
the system so that no one is well positioned to perform the certification 
function. If underwriters cannot do it within the time constraints they are 
given, other reputational intermediaries need to be identified and their 
services induced.”111 Another possibility arises in a market in which 
gatekeepers cannot perform an economically valuable certification function. 
In such a case, securities regulation would be better off not identifying any 
reputational intermediary at all. The act of “inducing” the services of a 
reputational intermediary is precisely the kind of regulatory intervention that 
creates regulatory licenses. 
To see one context in which regulatory costs or regulatory licenses might 
benefit underwriters indirectly, consider the effects of securities regulation 
 
 
 104. 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
 105. See In re USA Classic Sec. Litig., 1995 WL 363841, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); In re College 
Bound Consol. Litig., 1994 WL 172408, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that primary violations can be 
established where underwriters either make the allegedly offending statement or disseminate the 
statements of others). But see In re MTC Elec. Tech. Shareholders Litig., 898 F. Supp. 974, 986-87 
(E.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that participation by the underwriter in the drafting and circulation of the 
prospectus does not create a primary § 10(b) violation). 
 106. Phillips v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 933 F. Supp. 303, 316-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd, 108 
F.3d 1370 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. 
 109. See, e.g., Barbara A. Banoff, Regulatory Subsidies, Efficient Markets, and Shelf Registration: 
An Analysis of Rule 415, 70 VA. L. REV. 135, 184 (1984) (arguing that underwriter due diligence was 
no longer worth the cost because investors were—or could be—diversified); Fox, supra note 100, at 
1010 (arguing that due diligence was worth the cost because of reductions in agency costs). 
 110. See Coffee, supra note 81, at 1170 (“Perhaps irretrievably, underwriters have lost their role 
as reputational intermediaries in shelf registrations.”). 
 111. Id. at 1171. 
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related to underwriters from the perspective of the issuer, rather than the 
underwriter. From the issuer’s perspective, there are regulatory benefits 
associated with hiring an underwriter. Indeed, the issuer benefits most from 
hiring the most reputable underwriter. Is it possible that from the issuer’s 
perspective, the underwriter’s gatekeeping role is one that is influenced by 
regulatory costs or regulatory licenses dependent on securities regulation? 
First, consider the issuer’s decision to issue securities publicly or in a 
private placement. Public issues generate expected costs associated with 
§§ 11 and 12 whereas private placements generate expected costs associated 
with Rule 10b-5 but not § 11 or § 12. Accordingly, issuers have an incentive 
to prefer private placement deals with lower liability risks over riskier public 
offerings.112 Of course, a private placement might contain covenants and/or 
representations that would leave an issuer in the same position as in a public 
deal. If so, the costs of this private contracting could be minimized by a 
modified strict liability regime. In any event, the current regime seems 
suboptimal. As Coffee has noted, “[T]he unfortunate choice today may be 
between too much liability under Section 11 and too little liability in a private 
placement subject only to Rule 10b-5.”113 
Second, for public issues, the greater risks of liability create a regulatory 
entitlement among the certifying underwriter. For example, the directors in 
Smith v. Van Gorkom did not follow the then relatively common practice of 
soliciting a fairness opinion from an investment bank.114 The court in Van 
Gorkom suggested that although such fairness opinions were not required by 
law, the directors would have obtained some advantage in the case if they 
had obtained a fairness opinion. Thus, Van Gorkom created a regulatory 
entitlement related to fairness opinions.115 Similarly, SEC Rule 13e-3 
requires issuers to state whether a transaction is fair or unfair to unaffiliated 
shareholders and to disclose any fairness opinions prepared by investment 
bankers.116 State law also requires that directors consider valuation 
 
 
 112. One consequence of the modified strict liability proposal offered here might be to encourage 
issuers to return more frequently to public markets. 
 113. Coffee, supra note 81, at 1173. 
 114. 488 A.2d 858, 874-77 (Del. 1985). The Delaware legislature has effectively overruled the 
holding in this case. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1999). 
 115. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 BUS. 
LAW. 1437, 1453 (1985) (predicting that the most immediate effect of the opinion in Trans Union 
would be that “no firm considering a fundamental corporate change will do so without obtaining a 
fairness letter or other similar documentation from outside consultants”). Daniel Fischel argued that 
the cost of obtaining fairness opinions was effectively a judicial tax on fundamental corporate changes, 
the effect being that fewer such transactions would occur and shareholder returns would be reduced 
accordingly. Id. 
 116. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1997); SEC Schedule 13E-3, Items 8 and 9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 
(1999). 
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information before acting on a transaction.117 These requirements create 
regulatory costs and regulatory licenses by virtually requiring the use of an 
investment banker.118 
Moreover, because managers of the issuer typically are risk-averse and 
have a disproportionate amount of their human capital invested in the issuer, 
they will have incentives to spend whatever fees are required to obtain the 
highest quality investment banker’s opinion for a particular transaction. 
Assuming there are sufficient agency costs to enable managers to expend 
corporate resources on the highest quality opinions, the market for opinions 
from investment bankers becomes a winner-take-all market in which, 
because of regulation, the top investment banks are able to charge much 
higher fees than they would otherwise.119 Thus, the rules decouple the 
decision about how much to charge for an opinion (which now depends 
primarily on the value of the regulatory license) from the decision about how 
much in resources to spend supporting an opinion (which previously could 
vary in quality, based on the time spent and the number and quality/seniority 
of people assigned to work on the matter).120 Regulatory licenses thus reduce 
the incentives for competition among investment banks based on quality of 
service.  
Finally, abundant anecdotal evidence suggests that investment banks 
engage in potentially reputation-depleting activities in order to maximize 
profits. The relentless focus on annual bonuses and the dominant short-term 
profit maximization culture of investment banking is consistent with such 
activities. Substantial agency costs at investment banks prevent managers 
from restraining lower-level employees who have incentives to deplete the 
firm’s reputation to increase their own profits.121 Moreover, because of the 
 
 
 117. Robert J. Giuffra, Jr., Note, Investment Bankers’ Fairness Opinion in Corporate Control 
Transactions, 96 YALE L.J. 119, 124 (1986). 
 118. Several commentators have suggested that investment bankers should be liable to 
shareholders for negligent fairness opinions. See Ted J. Fiflis, Responsibility of Investment Bankers to 
Shareholders, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 497 (1992). See also Lucian A. Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, Fairness 
Opinions: How Fair Are They and What Can Be Done About It?, 1989 DUKE L.J. 27 (arguing that 
judges should carefully scrutinize fairness opinions); Charles M. Elson, Fairness Opinions: Are They 
Fair or Should We Care?, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 951 (1992); Giuffra, supra note 117 (arguing for increased 
obligations of directors in obtaining fairness opinions); Dale A. Osterlie, Fairness Opinions as Magic 
Pieces of Paper, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 541 (1992) (arguing that fiduciary principles should govern the 
investment banker’s relationship with the issuer). 
 119. Another problem with rules requiring fairness opinions is that they create incentives for 
directors or managers to rely on an investment bank instead of gathering information and forming and 
opinion on their own. 
 120. See Thomas & Hansen, supra note 102, at 1178. 
 121. See Dooley, supra note 1, at 840 (“[E]ven the most conscientious underwriter must expect 
occasional human error.”). 
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short-term compensation structure, it may be in managers’ collective interest 
to let such lower-level activities go unmonitored if reputational costs will be 
incurred, even by managers, only in future periods. Also, to the extent 
managers do not suffer along with their firm from reputation-depleting 
activities, they will not have adequate incentives to police such activities. In 
short, although the issue is complex,122 the dominant culture can fairly be 
described as somewhat barbaric: investment bankers “eat what they kill” and 
have few incentives to look beyond the next meal. 
Employees of investment banks have an enormous amount of power, 
much more than shareholders.123 Compensation accounts for roughly sixty 
percent of an investment bank’s costs, a very high percentage compared with 
other firms. Moreover, second-tier firms must pay even higher salaries and 
bonuses to attract top people.124 What are these employees doing to generate 
such great value? This section concludes with a few examples. 
The focus on short-term bonus compensation has affected the behavior of 
investment bankers in a variety of areas. Consider as one example equity 
analysts at investment banks. Such analysts are popular, powerful, and well–
paid, yet they generally are regarded by experts as adding very little social or 
informational value.125 Moreover, analysts face a serious conflict of interest: 
on one hand, they are supposed to be providing objective advice regarding 
companies; on the other hand, what they say has a dramatic effect on whether 
the company they are covering will hire the investment bank in future 
transactions. This corruption of securities analysts is a relatively recent 
phenomenon. One study, based on data from 1988 to 1994, indicated that 
analysts were an effective mechanism in reducing agency costs, thereby 
increasing shareholder value.126 Yet, by the end of 2000, the upward bias of 
analyst recommendations was both apparent and absurd, even to an 
 
 
 122. In a related context of rogue brokers, Donald Langevoort has remarked on the difficulty of 
balancing arguments on behalf of investment bankers against arguments on behalf of investors. See 
Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from Behavioral Economics 
About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 627, 629-31 (1996). Are rogue 
brokers acting against or in favor of the interests of management? Of the investment bank generally? 
Are investors themselves to blame for the broker’s actions? The questions depend greatly on how 
likely it is that individuals at investment banks will suffer much or all of the costs associated with 
potentially reputation-reducing activities. See id.  
 123. In fact, for scholars interested in the stakeholder model of the corporation, there is no better 
example of an employee-focused firm than top-tier (i.e., “bulge-bracket”) investment banks, a fact 
supporters of the stakeholder model may be reluctant to recognize.  
 124. See Powers of Concentration, THE ECONOMIST, July 15, 2000, at 71. 
 125. See Eli Amir et al., What Value Analysts? (July 2000) (NYU Stern School Working Paper, 
on file with author). 
 126. See John A. Doukas et al., Security Analysis, Agency Costs and Firm Characteristics, at 
http://papers.ssrn.com (last visited Aug. 10, 2001). 
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unsophisticated investor. Of 8,000 recommendations made by analysts 
covering companies in the Standard & Poor’s 500 stock index, only twenty-
nine were sells.127 
When a Goldman Sachs stock analyst recently grouped electronic 
commerce companies into “winners” and “losers”, it turned out that all of the 
winners except one were Goldman banking clients.128 Are investors surprised 
by such news? Does it deplete a bank’s reputation? Such practices certainly 
raise questions about the effectiveness of the “chinese walls” between 
investment banks’ research and investment banking activities, which in 
theory are independent. The fact that compensation of research analysts is 
linked to the fee revenue they generate for the investment banking unit also 
should harm the reputations of banks.129 Yet despite these questionable 
activities, the top investment banks have been able to preserve their 
reputations. In fact, it is fair to say that these banks have maintained their 
reputations notwithstanding the extraordinary attempts of their employees to 
deplete them. 
Investment banks move quickly into new business based on which 
business will maximize profits for that year.130 These moves tend to create 
concentrations of market power among a few banks, at least in the short run. 
Many parts of investment banking are quickly turned into commodity 
businesses, and those businesses are likely to receive fewer resources. The 
fact that half of some investment bank’s revenues are from trading should 
raise questions about how banks can earn unusual high profits in highly 
competitive stock, bond, foreign exchange, and derivatives markets. These 
profits indicate that investment banks are doing something more than just 
intermediating trades. What could generate such profits? Possibly, banks are 
trading based on favorable information, front-running clients, colluding to 
increase bid-offer spreads, or manipulating markets. Again, there is anecdotal 
evidence about top-tier banks engaging in these practices.131 Of course, 
 
 
 127. See Gretchen Morgenson, How Did So Many Get It So Wrong?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2000, 
at 1. 
 128. See Susan Pulliam, Goldman’s E-Commerce List Reduces Nonclients to Low Tiers, WALL 
ST. J., June 20, 2000, at C1. None of the companies in the bottom tier was a Goldman Sachs banking 
client. Id. at C2. 
 129. See id. 
 130. For example, the top five investment banks doubled their market share of U.S. mergers and 
acquisitions activity from 1990 to 2000. Powers of Concentration, supra note 124, at 71-72. 
 131. For example, Goldman Sachs was not overtly tarnished by its alleged failure to inform 
investors that Nina Brink, chair of internet company World Online, had sold most of her shares before 
an offer managed by Goldman. Goldman, drew threats from the Japanese government to exclude 
Goldman from a series of privatizations, potentially worth hundreds of millions of dollars in fees. See 
Garth Alexander, The Tipsters Who Never Say “Sell,” LONDON SUNDAY TIMES, Apr. 23, 2000, at 
http://www.Sunday-times.co.uk/news/pages/sti/2000/04/23/stibusnews02011.html (last visited Aug. 
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evidence of such behavior is very difficult to detect and is spotted only 
occasionally. The goal here is not to submit evidence of nefarious activities 
by investment bankers. Instead, the point is that the substantial profits from 
investment banking at least raise questions about whether investment banks 
are engaging in what scholars would regard as reputation-depleting activities 
without actually depleting their reputations. 
Investment banks also have engaged in potentially reputation-depleting 
behavior with respect to venture capital investing and IPOs. Banks frequently 
engage in venture capital investing and then sell their shares following an 
IPO in a market supported by the banks’ equity analysts. In 1999-2000, up to 
twenty-two percent of some investment bank’s profits were from “private 
equity” and venture capital investing; in 1998, the percentage was 
approximately four percent.132 Moreover, there is evidence that banks collude 
to set fees in the IPO market, although some of that evidence has been 
disputed.133 The SEC recently has investigated whether investment banks 
have engaged in the practice of asking a small number of large investors to 
pay above-average commissions in exchange for allocations in certain “hot” 
IPOs.134 
These anecdotes might simply be isolated instances of abuse that can be 
explained away. They are not offered as anything more than mere anecdotes 
to illustrate a few examples of facts consistent with the arguments about 
regulatory licenses offered in the first part of this section. In other words, if 
regulatory costs have resulted in high barriers to entry, investment banks 
have had incentives to engage (without much reputational consequence) in 
activities that otherwise would have depleted their reputations. These barriers 
exist because issuers and investors need to return to one of a small number of 
top-tier members of the resulting oligopoly, even if those members have less-
than-pristine records. This argument, if plausible, is consistent with 
economically rational behavior by investment banking gatekeepers, and 
scholars should not expect reputational constraints to prevent such behavior 
in the future. Again, this is not an attempt to make any well-supported set of 
empirical allegations against investment banks. Instead, the points are that 
economically rational investment banks have incentives to engage in 
reputation-depleting activity when the expected benefits exceed the expected 
 
 
10, 2001). The goal here is not to isolate Goldman Sachs. In fact, the only reason to select stories about 
Goldman Sachs is that the firm seems to be regarded as having the highest reputation for quality in 
numerous areas.  
 132. Mark Maremont, Raising the Stakes, WALL ST. J., July 24, 2000, at A1. 
 133. See generally Initial Public Offering Resources, at http://www.iporesources.org (last visited 
Sept. 8, 2001). 
 134. See eToys Press Release, supra note 87. 
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costs, that investment banks at least occasionally engage in such activities, 
and that there may be regulatory cost- or regulatory license-related 
explanations of why investment banks would perceive that the expected 
benefits of such activities exceed their expected costs. 
One final reason why investment banks can preserve reputations for 
quality, notwithstanding potentially reputation-depleting activities, is that it is 
difficult for investors to know which “brand name” to punish. The banking 
industry has undergone numerous mergers resulting in constant changes, 
making it virtually impossible for investors to gauge reputational capital with 
any accuracy. For example, the National Association of Securities Dealers 
(NASD) recently alleged that Morgan Stanley Dean Witter committed 
securities fraud by misstating risks of $2.1 billion of closed-end bond funds 
based on disclosures, sales, and losses that occurred before Morgan Stanley 
merged with Dean Witter in 1997.135 Should investors punish the Morgan 
Stanley Dean Witter name based on this alleged fraud? Or should investors 
assume that Morgan Stanley’s role in future business will not be tarnished by 
the merger with Dean Witter? Does it matter whether the institution is called 
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, or as of January 29, 2001, again just Morgan 
Stanley? 
2. Accounting Firms  
As with underwriters, Gilson and Kraakman have argued that accounting 
firms serve as reputational intermediaries.136 However, as with underwriters, 
an argument can be made that accounting firms do not survive and prosper 
solely based on their reputational capital. Instead, accounting firms benefit 
directly and indirectly both from regulatory costs and from regulatory 
licenses stemming from extant securities regulation. 
First, for accountants, there are some direct regulatory licenses of the type 
that benefit UL and bond credit rating agencies. These regulatory licenses are 
derived from SEC rules and regulations setting forth standards with respect 
to accountants and the audit function. In addition, there are indirect 
regulatory licenses stemming from the fact that the securities laws envision 
and authorize a self-regulatory apparatus that imposes additional standards 
and consequently benefits top-tier accounting firms the most. 
 
 
 135. See Randall Smith, NASD Alleges That Dean Witter Misstated Risks on Bond Funds, WALL 
ST. J., Nov. 21, 2000, at C1. 
 136. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 607-08 n.166 (“While part of their value lies in their 
ability to exploit economies of scale and scope, third-party verifiers such as certified public 
accountants also function as reputational intermediaries . . . only if the accountant can be expected to 
treat the client at arm’s length is its message of verification believable.”). 
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Title 17 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 210 sets forth in great 
detail the minimum qualifications for certified and public accountants and for 
accountants’ reports.137 The SEC will not recognize any person as a certified 
public accountant who is not registered and in good standing in the relevant 
state. The regulations also set forth extensive restrictions on financial, 
employment, and business relationships. In general, the SEC requires that 
accountants be independent.138 Non-audit-related ties to other firms 
(especially to the issuer) can jeopardize an accountant’s independence.139 In 
recent years, serious questions have arisen regarding potential conflicts of 
interest between the audit function of an accounting firm and its more 
lucrative consulting function. In response to these concerns, the SEC sought 
to segregate the audit and consulting functions of major accounting firms and 
ultimately reached agreement with those firms, which have proceeded to 
 
 
 137. 17 C.F.R. § 210 (1999). These qualifications depend on certification requirements specified 
by the relevant state licensing agency. Qualifications of Accountants, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(a) (1999). 
 138. Sections 210.2-01(b) & (c) provide as follows: 
 (b) The Commission will not recognize any certified public accountant or public accountant 
as independent who is not in fact independent. For example, an accountant will be considered not 
independent with respect to any person or any of its parents, its subsidiaries,  or  other affiliates 
 (1) in which, during the period of his professional engagement to examine the financial 
statements being reported on or at the date of his report, he, his firm, or a member of his firm 
had, or was committed to acquire, any direct financial interest or any material indirect 
financial interest; 
 (2) with which, during the period of his professional engagement to examine the 
financial statements being reported on, at the date of his report or during the period covered 
by the financial statements, he, his firm, or a member of his firm was connected as a 
promoter, underwriter, voting trustee, director, officer, or employee. A firm's independence 
will not be deemed to be affected adversely where a former officer or employee of a 
particular person is employed by or becomes a partner, shareholder or other principal in the 
firm and such individual has completely disassociated himself from the person and its 
affiliates and does not participate in auditing financial statements of the person or its affiliates 
covering any period of his employment by the person. For the purposes of 210.2-01(b), the 
term member means  
 (i) all partners, shareholders, and other principals in the firm,  
 (ii) any professional employee involved in providing any professional service to the 
person, its parents, subsidiaries, or other affiliates, and 
 (iii) any professional employee having managerial responsibilities and located in 
[the engagement office] or other office of the firm which participates in a significant 
portion of the audit. 
(c) In determining whether an accountant may in fact be not independent with respect to a 
particular person, the Commission will give appropriate consideration to all relevant 
circumstances, including evidence bearing all relationships between the accountant and that 
person or any affiliate thereof, and will not confine itself to the relationships existing in connection 
with the filing of reports with the Commission. 
17 C.F.R. §§ 210.2-01(b) & (c) (emphasis added). 
 139. See id. 
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segregate the functions.140 These rules effectively grant regulatory licenses to 
established accounting firms and impose barriers to entry on other firms. 
Accordingly, they generate value and some market power for top-tier 
accounting firms.141 
Federal regulations also require registered companies to file audited 
financial statements, including audited statements from the previous three 
fiscal years.142 There are detailed instructions regarding income 
statements,143 changes in stockholders’ equity,144 financial statements 
covering businesses acquired or to be acquired,145 and numerous other 
detailed requirements, including instructions related to financial 
derivatives.146 
Other regulations cover the content and quality of accountant reports.147 
For example, accountant reports must be in good form with all the relevant 
titles, dates, the auditor’s name and address, and a list of statements 
covered.148 Any accountant report must state whether it was made in 
 
 
 140. See Revision of the Commission’s Auditor Independence Requirements, Release Nos. 33-
7919; 34-43602; 35-27279; IC-24744; IA-1911; FR-56; File No. S7-13-00, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
¶ 86,406 (Dec. 1, 2000). 
 141. In addition, these rules can affect the status of accounting firms in litigation. For example, a 
nonindependent accounting firm arguably is more likely to be deemed a “seller” under § 12(a)(2). 
 142. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-01-02 (year). 
 143. See id. § 210.3-03. 
 144. See id. § 210.3-04. 
 145. See id. § 210.3-05. 
 146. See id. § 210.3-06-20. See also id. § 210.4-08(n) (providing instructions for derivatives). 
 147. See id. § 210.2-02. 
 148. Id. Section 210.2-02 provides as follows: 
(a) Technical requirements. The accountant's report: 
 (1) Shall be dated;  
 (2) Shall be signed manually;  
 (3) Shall indicate the city and State where issued; and  
 (4) Shall identify without detailed enumeration the financial statements covered by the report. 
(b) Representations as to the audit. The accountant's report:  
 (1) Shall state whether the audit was made in accordance with generally accepted auditing 
standards; and  
 (2) Shall designate any auditing procedures deemed necessary by the accountant under the 
circumstances of the particular case, which have been omitted, and the reasons for their omission. 
Nothing in this rule shall be construed to imply authority for the omission of any procedure which 
independent accountants would ordinarily employ in the course of an audit made for the purpose 
of expressing the opinions required by paragraph (c) of this section.  
(c) Opinion to be expressed. The accountant's report shall state clearly: 
 (1) The opinion of the accountant in respect of the financial statements covered by the report 
and the accounting principles and practices reflected therein; and  
 (2) the opinion of the accountant as to the consistency of the application of the accounting 
principles, or as to any changes in such principles which have a material effect on the financial 
statements.  
(d) Exceptions. Any matters to which the accountant takes exception shall be clearly identified, the 
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accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP),149 
thereby effectively requiring that accounting firms use GAAP in their 
reports.150 The rules refer to accounting principles more generally, and 
thereby grant power to the accountants’ self-regulatory organization and its 
interpretation of appropriate standards. The rules also increase the value of 
deviations from professional standards.151 
The dependence of federal regulation on a private body of self-regulatory 
auditing standards also benefits top-tier firms by creating indirect regulatory 
licenses. The preparation of financial reports is governed by a body of 
auditing standards. Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1 states that the 
goal of an audit is the expression of an opinion about the fairness of financial 
statements.152 This opinion requires judgment and must be based on sound 
reasoning and GAAP.153 The American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants also promulgates standards that implicitly are approved of in 
federal regulations.154  
In addition to the GAAP rules, there are generally accepted auditing 
standards (GAAS) that require, among other things, that auditors be both 
independent and technically competent. In particular, GAAS General 
Standard 3 requires the use of “due professional care”—the typical standard 
of care expected of a reasonable and prudent accountant. These standards 
require that accounting firms employ proper procedures for review and 
approval of audits and audit opinions, and also that firms engage in adequate 
training and supervision. Requiring such practices might seem 
uncontroversial. However, enshrining standards in a self-regulatory 
framework creates incentives for firms to engage in activities designed not 
only to satisfy the standards for valid business reasons but also to obtain 
assurance that the firm will not be found liable in the event there are material 
misrepresentations or omissions related to the audit. For example, comfort 
 
 
exception thereto specifically and clearly stated, and, to the extent practicable, the effect of each 
such exception on the related financial statements given. (See section 101 of the Codification of 
Financial Reporting Policies.)  
Id. 
 149. See id. § 210.2-02(b). 
 150. See also Reg. S-X, Rule 4-01(a)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 210 (1999). 
 151. Public corporations can dismiss their accountants in disputes over auditing practices, and, 
although it is impossible to quantify, at least a portion of these dismissals are “shopping” efforts by 
issuers seeking accountants willing to certify their financial statements on favorable terms. See 
Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 1, at 73 n.62. Such dismissals, however, require disclosure on 
Form 8-K and are almost always referred to the SEC’s Division of Enforcement. 
 152. Statement of Auditing Standards No. 1.  
 153. Id.  
 154. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-02(b)-(c). 
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letters from auditors typically not only state that the auditor is independent, 
but also comment on financial statement compliance with securities 
registration requirements and changes in various required financial 
information, all with a view of complying with regulations and self-
regulatory standards. Plaintiffs in suits against accounting firms can point to 
these standards in alleging violations of the securities laws. 
Finally, accountants, like underwriters, face uncertain liability for 
violations of the securities laws because of ambiguity in judicial decisions. 
Accountants arguably face a higher probability of liability than underwriters, 
and the standards applicable in cases involving accountants are even less 
certain. This uncertainty forces accountants to take great precautions to 
protect themselves from future litigation and therefore increases the barriers 
to entry. 
Commentators have documented the myriad ways in which accountants 
can be held liable as gatekeepers.155 For accounting firms, the uncertainty 
associated with potential liability costs generates valuable property rights and 
increases the barriers to entry imposed on new, potentially lower quality 
firms. At the same time, accounting fraud can be virtually impossible to 
detect, so imposing liability may not generate deterrence benefits.156 
The same legal rules governing liability of underwriters apply to 
accounting firms performing audit functions for securities issues. As with the 
rules and cases for underwriters, there is great uncertainty surrounding the 
question of when and whether accountants can be liable for misleading 
statements.157 Adding to the uncertainty of federal rules is the fact that 
various state courts have found accountants liable to foreseeable third parties 
for material mistakes in financial statements.158 Courts have held that an 
 
 
 155. See Jack E. Karns et al., Accountant and Attorney Liability as “Sellers” of Securities Under 
Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933: Judicial Rejection of the Statutory, Collateral Participant 
Status Cause of Action, 74 NEB. L. REV. 1 (1995); Richard M. Weinroth, Overview of Civil and 
Criminal Liability of Clients and Attorneys for Federal and Arizona Securities Violations, 26 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 1 (1994). 
 156. See In the Matter of Cendant Corp., Admin. Proc. No. 3-10225, 2000 SEC LEXIS 1237 (June 
14, 2000). The Cendant matter involved accounting fraud at CUC International Inc., which became 
Cendant following a merger with HFS Incorporated. Id. at *4-*5 CUC provided membership-based 
consumer services, such as auto, dining, shopping, and travel “clubs”. Id. at *3. Cendant was found to 
have violated the securities laws based on CUC senior managers’ practice of comparing preliminary 
quarterly results with analysts’ expectations and directing that income be adjusted to correspond with 
expectations. Id. at *14.  
 157. See, e.g., Anixter v. Hane-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1226 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that 
an accountant must actually make a misleading statement to be liable); In re JWP, Inc. Sec. Litig., 928 
F. Supp. 1239, 1256 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that a defendant may not be liable under 10(b) unless it 
actually made a misrepresentation); In re MTC Elec. Tech. S’holders Litig., 898 F. Supp. 974, 987 
(E.D.N.Y. 1995) (same). 
 158. See Walpert, Smullian & Blumenthal P.A. v. Katz, Md., 762 A.2d 582, 608-09 (Md. App. 
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accountant’s good faith compliance with GAAP discharges the accountant’s 
professional obligation to act with due care, making compliance with GAAP 
even more important.159 Compliance with GAAP, however, does not insulate 
an accountant from liability.160 
There also is a lack of clear judicial direction about the scope of 
accountant liability after several different interpretations of the Central Bank 
of Denver’s holding limitating on secondary liability. Many of the cases 
addressing the scope of gatekeeper liability after Central Bank of Denver 
have involved accountants. A brief sample is illustrative. 
In In re Software Toolworks, Inc., the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit stated that an accountant could be held primarily liable under § 10(b) 
for misrepresentations contained in a client’s letter to the SEC if the 
accountant played a “significant role” in drafting the letter.161 Conversely, in 
Anixter v. Home-Stake Production Co., the Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit declared that a misstatement must have been made by the accountant 
rather than by his client,162 and it disapproved of decisions such as Software 
Toolworks that “allow liability to attach without requiring a representation to 
be made by [the accountant] defendant” as inconsistent with Central Bank of 
Denver.163 In In re ZZZZ Best Securities Litigation, the U.S. District Court 
for the Northern District of California held that it was not necessary for 
investors to know that statements in the offering documents were attributable 
to the accountant; instead, where the accountant was “intricately involved” in 
the preparation of solicitation documents, it was up to the accountant to 
ensure that statements in those documents were correct.164 In O’Neil v. Appel, 
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan held that 
accountants who merely review and approve their clients’ offering 
documents are not subject to liability, but noted that accountants who had 
“assisted in the drafting” might be liable.165 Finally, in Picard Chemical, Inc. 
 
 
2000); Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110, 120-21 (N.Y. 1985). 
 159. See Monroe v. Hughes, 31 F.3d 772, 775-76 (9th Cir. 1994); SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 
590 F.2d 785, 788-89 (9th Cir. 1979).  
 160. See Monroe, 31 F.3d at 774. 
 161. 50 F.3d 615, 628 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 162. 77 F.3d 1215, 1226-27 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 163. Id. at 1226 n.10. 
 164. 864 F. Supp. 960, 970 (C.D. Cal. 1994). See also Adam v. Silicon Valley Bancshares, 884 F. 
Supp. 1398, 1401 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that an accountant who provided “significant assistance” 
in preparing offering violated § 10(b)); Cashman v. Coopers & Lybrand, 877 F. Supp. 425, 432-34 
(N.D. Ill. 1995) (same). 
 165. 897 F. Supp. 995, 1000 (W.D. Mich. 1995). See also In re Kendall Square Research Corp. 
Sec. Litig., 868 F. Supp. 26, 28 (D. Mass. 1994) (holding that an accountant who reviews and approves 
of quarterly financial statements does not make a statement).  
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Profit Sharing Plan v. Perrigo Co.,166 the same Michigan district court stated 
that misstatements must actually be made by the accountant, but by citing 
O’Neil v. Appel,167 the Picard Chemical court created uncertainty about 
whether statements drafted by accountants were “made” by them.168 Based 
on these cases, it is fair to say that the state of the law with respect to 
accountant liability is uncertain. 
As a brief case study, it is worth considering the role of accountants in 
supporting corporate tax shelters. Admittedly, writing opinion letters for 
corporate tax shelters is a different function than auditing financial 
statements or certifying new securities issues. Nevertheless, recent data with 
respect to accountants’ roles in corporate tax shelters sheds some light on the 
more difficult to observe audit function. Moreover, Kraakman has cited tax 
practitioners and tax shelter opinions as a type of gatekeeping function.169 
All of the major accounting firms and many investment banks sell such 
corporate tax shelter products. Interestingly, the firms charge fees based on 
the tax savings the shelters generate.170 Very few tax shelters are uncovered 
and criminal penalties are rare. From a cost-benefit perspective, the potential 
profits seem worth the extremely small risk of being caught. In fact, some 
practitioners have spoken in precisely these “expected value” terms. 
Consider the following comments by Paul J. Sax, formerly chair of the ABA 
tax section and a partner at the firm of Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe in San 
Francisco: 
I have a chance of being hit by the I.R.S. with a 20 percent penalty 
. . . . Based on my experience I calculate that chance to be one in 50 
because the likelihood of the I.R.S. detecting this transaction in my 
very large tax return is small, the chance of them pursuing it correctly 
is small, the chance of them pursuing through to litigation is small, the 
chance a judge will uphold the penalty is small.171 
 
 
 166. See Picard Chem., Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Perrigo Co., 940 F. Supp. 1101, 1119 (W.D. 
Mich. 1996). 
 167. See O'Neil, 897 F. Supp. at 999. 
 168. See Picard Chem., Inc., 940 F. Supp. at 1120. 
 169. Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 1, at 65, 68 n.45. 
 170. Many accounting and tax professionals view charging a fee based on taxes avoided as 
unethical. See David Cay Johnston, Sham Shelters for Business Flourish as Scrutiny Fades, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2000, at A1, available at 2000 WL30526201 (reporting that the United States Tax 
Court ruled that the deal was a sham, and that ruling was upheld on appeal). An alternative to such fees 
is “value pricing,” which is based on the client’s willingness to pay and therefore is only indirectly 
based on taxes avoided. In 1990, for example, Merrill Lynch created a deal that saved Allied Signal 
$180 million in one transaction and received a $25 million fee. Id. 
 171. Id.  
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Suppose a deal involves a tax savings of $100 million and would pay a $7 
million fee. As Sax puts it, that means that “once I get past ‘I know I am 
doing something wrong here,’ the arithmetic settles it for me. What is $7 
million for at least an 80 percent chance at $100 million?”172  
Those numbers are from the taxpaying firm’s perspective. From the 
prespective of the provider of the shelter, the arithmetic also makes sense. 
Practitioners have estimated that it takes about one hundred hours for an 
expert to create a tax shelter so it can be sold.173 The calculus also works for 
lawyers asked to render an opinion characterizing tax-avoidance transactions 
as legitimate. Clients offer tax lawyers up to one million dollars for such 
opinions. Buck Chapoton, a tax lawyer at Vinson & Elkins in Washington 
and a former tax policy chief for President Reagan, said that “[f]or those 
kinds of fees, purveyors are not buying your professional advice. They are 
buying your good name and, sadly, at those prices there are lawyers and law 
firms that will sell.”174 
Some firms refuse to participate in questionable tax shelters, although it is 
difficult to argue that they acquire reputation capital as a result. Is Ford 
Motor Company, which has not done such deals, more reputable than 
Colgate-Palmolive or United Parcel Service, which have?175 
The role of accountants in supporting tax shelters illuminates the 
problems associated with relying on accountants’ opinions. If accountants are 
willing to engage in potentially reputation-depleting activities with respect to 
tax shelters, they should be willing to engage in potentially reputation-
depleting activities with respect to audits and other functions, too. The direct 
and indirect benefits associated with regulatory licenses stemming from 
securities rules, self-regulatory standards, and ambiguous court decisions 
allow accountants to engage in such activities without suffering the 
reputational losses predicted by the reputational intermediary arguments. 
3. Securities Lawyers 
Securities lawyers benefit less directly from regulatory costs and 
regulatory licenses than do underwriters and accountants. Nevertheless, there 
is some evidence of direct benefit, and the due diligence defense and related 
cases have generated substantial indirect benefits for lawyers. Moreover, the 
 
 
 172. Id. Even U.S. Treasury officials estimate that audits uncover only approximately ten percent 
of illegitimate tax shelters. The Treasury often learns of shelters from anonymous mailings of 
documents. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
p491 Partnoy.doc  12/20/2001   9:12 AM 
 
 
 
 
 
536 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 79:491 
 
 
 
 
SEC has acted informally to impose additional burdens on lawyers. In 
general, the SEC has influenced the behavior of securities lawyers with the 
view that lawyers involved in securities transactions are the guardians of the 
interests of the investing public.176 According to one commentator, SEC 
pronouncements have “terrified the general practitioner, segregated a 
uniquely complex area of highly-specialized practice, and upgraded the 
standards of care applicable to securities lawyers.”177 Even so, these costs are 
difficult to quantify and might not exceed the reputational constraints 
securities lawyers would face even absent SEC pressure. 
Any regulatory licenses, to the extent they exist, stem from the securities 
law requirement of an opinion from counsel regarding registration 
statements. Like other gatekeepers, securities lawyers provide opinions about 
elements of a financial transaction. Legal opinions arise in various contexts 
in a registered public offering of securities. Although one expects publicly 
offered securities to be traded after the offering, attorneys rarely give 
opinions to the public with respect to the offering. Instead, counsel for the 
issuer typically gives a public opinion limited to the minimum necessary to 
satisfy the requirements of the 1933 Act.178 As the scope of this opinion is 
typically quite narrow, regulatory licenses are likely to be of only minor 
value. Item 601 Exhibits of Regulation S-K requires only that registration 
statements contain as an exhibit “[a]n opinion of counsel as to the legality of 
the securities being registered, indicating whether they will, when sold, be 
legally issued, fully paid and non-assessable, and, if debt securities, whether 
they will be binding obligations of the registrant.”179 Nevertheless, an 
issuer’s counsel can charge a fee for preparing this opinion, regardless of 
whether it has any value apart from satisfying the regulatory requirement. 
The more troublesome area with respect to the role of securities lawyers 
concerns opinions that are not given to the public. Issuers typically receive a 
much more detailed nonpublic opinion regarding an issuance of securities 
from their counsel.180 The underwriters, who are the initial purchasers in the 
 
 
 176. James H. Cheek, III, Professional Responsibility and Self-Regulation of the Securities 
Lawyer, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 597, 617 (1975). 
 177. Manning Gilbert Warren, III, The Primary Liability of Securities Lawyers, 50 SMU L. REV. 
383, 397 (1996). 
 178. For example, such opinions typically cover only the validity of the securities. See Richard R. 
Howe, The Duties and Liabilities of Attorneys in Rendering Legal Opinions, 1989 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 283, 287 (1989). 
 179. 17 C.F.R. § 229.601(b)(5) (1999). 
 180. See Keith L. Kearney & Robert Lovejoy, Underwriter and Dealer Materials, in MICHAEL J. 
HALLORAN ET AL., VENTURE CAPITAL & PUBLIC OFFERING NEGOTIATION 32-66-73 (3d ed. Supp. 
2001). 
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offering, typically receive a nonpublic opinion from separate counsel.181 Both 
counsel for the issuer and counsel for the underwriters typically provide the 
underwriters an opinion stating that, based on their preparation and review, 
they believe the information in the prospectus is materially accurate.182 
What is the purpose of the separate legal opinions? At the outset, it is 
worth noting that only a portion of the opinion of the issuer’s counsel, which 
typically is limited to a statement about the validity of the securities, is 
disclosed to the public. It is difficult to argue that any private opinion of 
underwriter’s counsel (e.g., with respect to broader issues, such as Rule 10b-
5) serves a public gatekeeping function. If the opinion is not publicly 
available, it cannot be an important factor in the investors’ investment 
decision.183  
However, this analysis leaves open the more important question of why 
underwriters demand separate, nonpublic opinions from both issuer’s counsel 
and their own counsel. Here, the answer is more complex. One possibility is 
that the primary purpose is to assist the underwriters in establishing an iron-
clad due diligence defense. 
An underwriter does not necessarily establish its due diligence defense 
simply because it receives an opinion from a law firm. Reliance on a 
“reputable” law firm is an important factor in establishing the defense. 
Underwriters typically require that the issuer’s counsel be a top-tier law firm. 
To some extent, underwriters send a signal to investors through the 
reputational quality of issuer’s counsel. Interestingly, the 1933 Act requires 
that registration statements disclose “the names and addresses of counsel 
who have passed on the legality of the issue.”184 One reason for the 
requirement is to ensure that investors learn when less reputable law firms 
certify the legality of an issue. Of course, an underwriter might disclose the 
names of its law firms without such a rule, but the rule nonetheless ensures 
that all underwriters do so. This rule works to the benefit of the most 
prestigious firms. An underwriter who knows that the name and address of its 
counsel will be displayed prominently on a prospectus will have an incentive 
 
 
 181. Id. at 75-77. The opinion of underwriters’ counsel like the nonpublic opinion of issuer’s 
counsel, typically would cover not only the validity of the securities, but other issues as well. These 
issues include the absence of conflicts with specified agreements and instruments, representations 
related to defaults under any other outstanding securities, and assurances regarding potential violations 
of law in connection with the issuance of the securities. Id. See also Howe, supra note 178, at 287. 
 182. See Howe, supra note 178, at 287. 
 183. On the other hand, sophisticated investors are aware that these opinions are given and have 
general knowledge about the contents of these opinions. Moreover, if counsel is unwilling to give an 
opinion, the underwriters will not proceed with the offering. 
 184. See Item (23) of Schedule A to the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa(23) (1934). 
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to pick a marquis law firm. 
Perhaps most importantly, § 11(b)(3)(C) of the 1933 Act states that a 
person other than the issuer who otherwise would be liable for a false or 
misleading statement in a registration statement may avoid liability by 
proving that “he had no reasonable ground to believe and did not believe” 
that statements made on the authority of an “expert” other than himself were 
untrue.185 This provision enables an underwriter to rely on the expertise of 
outside counsel. It is unclear whether simply rendering an opinion as to the 
legality of securities qualifies counsel as an “expert” for these purposes.186 
Opinions of counsel typically state that the attorney assumes no 
responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or fairness of statements in the 
prospectus; instead, underwriters bear this responsibility. Accordingly, an 
underwriter is provided assurance by the involvement of a top-tier law firm, 
especially as to the opinion of the issuer’s counsel. Put another way, an 
underwriter who decided not to engage a top-tier law firm to perform this 
task, or who decided to rely on a less reputable issuer’s counsel, would risk 
losing an argument about the reasonableness of its reliance if the due 
diligence defense is litigated. Consequently, top-tier firms benefit from these 
regulatory entitlements and can charge a premium for their opinions. 
Finally, like accountants, attorneys involved in securities transactions are 
frequently sued based on various state and federal claims,187 and judicial 
decisions related to attorney liability have created uncertain standards.188 
Plaintiffs frequently base lawsuits against lawyers on the opinions given by 
counsel as part of an offering, and, like accountants, courts have held 
attorneys liable under Rule 10b-5 for tax opinion letters that recklessly 
included materially false statements.189 Courts also have held attorneys liable 
for drafting false and misleading offering documents because they failed to 
investigate disclosed facts or because they breached a duty owed to 
investors.190 Furthermore, courts have held attorneys liable for drafting 
 
 
 185. Id. § 77k(b)(3) (2000). 
 186. See Howe, supra note 178, at 286 n.9. 
 187. These claims include §§ 11, 12(1), 12(a)(2), 15, and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933; 
§§ 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act; and state blue sky laws. See Beck, supra note 76, at 794. 
 188. Warren, III, supra note 177, at 398-402. 
 189. See Beck, supra note 76, at 794 (listing cases where attorneys were found liable under Rule 
10b-5). 
 190. The Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the question of what duty an attorney owes 
to third parties under Rule 10b-5. Lower courts have taken widely varying approaches depending on 
the facts of the particular cases, including the characteristics of a particular defendant and transaction. 
See Breard v. Sachnoff & Weaver, Ltd., 941 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1991); Employers Ins. v. Musick, 
Peeler, & Garrett, 871 F. Supp. 381 (S.D. Cal. 1994); Walco Invs., Inc. v. Thenen, 881 F. Supp. 1576 
(S.D. Fla. 1995); In re Flight Transp. Corp. Sec. Litig., 593 F. Supp. 612 (D. Minn. 1984). 
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opinion letters containing misstatements about tax shelters.191 In addition, 
even after Central Bank of Denver, an attorney may be liable for drafting 
disclosure documents or opinion letters, although the courts are split on this 
issue.192 Substantial uncertainty still surrounds the liability of attorneys after 
Central Bank of Denver.193  
For example, in Employers Insurance of Wausau v. Musick, Peeler & 
Garrett, the court held that attorneys who draft offering documents for clients 
can be primarily liable under § 10(b) for misstatements or omissions in those 
documents.194 In Klein v. Boyd, the court held that attorneys are not liable 
under § 10(b) unless the misstatements or omissions appear in opinions that 
the attorneys issued and signed.195 In addition, the court found that even 
attorneys who do not issue or sign offering documents “may be liable for a 
primary violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when the [attorney’s] 
participation in the creation of a statement containing a misrepresentation or 
omission of material fact is sufficiently significant that the statement can 
properly be attributed to the lawyer as its author or co-author.”196  
The uncertainty generated by such cases has existed since Escott v. 
BarChris, where the court held the underwriters, accountants, and attorneys 
all liable for failure to perform a reasonable investigation under the 
circumstances.197 The attorney, who was also a director, was held to a higher 
due diligence standard in part because he was an attorney. One way of 
interpreting this requirement is that it keeps the standards of the legal 
profession high. This argument has been used to impose heightened duties on 
 
 
 191. See Ackerman v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841, 843 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that an attorney could 
be held liable even though he owed no duty to the individual investors because he allowed promoters 
to release letter to representatives of investors). 
 192. See Beck, supra note 76, at 794. 
 193. Although attorneys can still be held liable for their own misrepresentations under a theory of 
primary liability, courts have split over when liability will attach to attorneys for the misstatements of 
others. See also Employers Ins. v. Musick, Peeler & Garrett, 871 F. Supp. 381, 388-89 (S.D. Cal. 
1994) (denying attorney’s motion to dismiss Rule 10b-5 claim for drafting a misleading prospectus); 
Walco Invs., Inc. v. Thenen, 881 F. Supp. 1576, 1582-83 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (denying attorney’s motion 
for summary judgment based on false statements made by the client but contained in an offering 
document prepared by the attorney). As with accountants, this split has generated great confusion. See 
generally Cynthia A. Bedrick, Defining the Duty: Attorneys’ Obligations Under Rule 10b-5, 74 IND. 
L.J. 1297 (1999); Ann Maxey, Competing Duties? Securities Lawyers’ Liability After Central Bank, 64 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2185 (1996).  
 194. 871 F. Supp. 381, 389 (S.D. Cal. 1994). 
 195. Klein v. Boyd, 1998 WL 55245, at *1 (3d Cir. Feb. 12, 1998). 
 196. Id. at *12. The court in In re Towers Fin. Corp. Noteholders Litig., 1995 WL 571888, at *18 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 1995), also held that issuer’s counsel, who had no “direct communication” with 
the investor plaintiffs, owed no § 10(b) duty disclosure to them. In Towers, however, the lawyers did 
not prepare any of the offering documents used to solicit investors. Id. at *2-4. 
 197. 283 F. Supp. 643, 682-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
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attorneys investigating the accuracy of prospectuses. An alternative 
interpretation is that it forces attorneys to bear costs they otherwise would not 
incur and, as a result, both raises the barriers to entry in the securities law 
area (further entrenching established firms with top reputations) and provides 
a regulatory justification for attorneys to bill untold hours on tasks of dubious 
social value.  
This section has attempted to set forth some of the ways in which lawyers 
can benefit from the existence of regulatory costs and regulatory licenses. 
There are statutory and self-regulatory provisions, as well as judicial 
opinions, all of which benefit to top-tier law firms. These provisions, as 
interpreted, may explain to some extent why some top-tier law firms 
continue to engage in an arduous, time-consuming due diligence exercise 
even when the costs seem to exceed the expected benefits (for example, for 
established public issuers). Perhaps most importantly, underwriters faced 
with potential liability have incentives to hire only the best issuer’s counsel to 
insure the viability of a due diligence defense. 
IV. A MODIFIED STRICT LIABILITY REGIME 
Part III argued that gatekeepers profit not only from their accumulated 
reputational capital but also, to a large extent, from the structure of securities 
regulation. This Part outlines a possible solution to that problem. My hope is 
that even scholars who are not sympathetic to this solution will recognize that 
imposing gatekeeper liability through a due diligence approach generates 
unwarranted costs. 
The proposal is simple: impose strict liability on gatekeepers for material 
misstatements and omissions in offering documents and remove any due 
diligence-based defenses from securities regulation. For example, Congress 
should amend § 11 to impose strict liability not only on the issuer and 
directors, but also on all experts. Congress should add an additional provision 
to enable experts to specify the range of liability as a percentage of the 
issuer’s liability, subject to a specified minimum percentage. 
This proposal is not as radical as it might seem. In fact, several proposals 
have gone part way down this road. Rule 176 and Choi’s proposal for a 
market-based due diligence system are examples. The problems with these 
alternatives is that they do not go far enough and, as a result, generate 
additional costs.  
The SEC has promulgated Rule 176 to clarify what factors are relevant in 
determining whether the defendant has met her burden of proof in asserting 
the due diligence defense. These factors include the type of firm, the type of 
security, the sophistication of the defendant, and the reasonable reliance on 
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reports.198 The key point is that the multifactor test of Rule 176 anticipates 
allowing the level of due diligence required to vary based on several 
variables, which makes adjudication costly. 
Rule 176 identifies a limited number of factors that constitute “relevant 
circumstances” for the purpose of determining whether a defendant has 
satisfied the due diligence defense provided by § 11(b)(3) of the 1933 Act.199 
Unfortunately, the multifactor test of Rule 176 has not proved useful in 
practice; to my knowledge, no court has dismissed any § 11 claim on the 
basis of Rule 176. This result is not surprising: the costs associated with 
applying this multifactor test would be even greater than those of a 
universally applicable due diligence defense. Accordingly, Rule 176 is too 
costly to be useful. 
Choi’s proposal suffers from similar problems. Choi has recommended a 
self-tailored liability regime in which gatekeepers would establish their own 
procedures appropriate to a transaction.200 The notion of applying different 
standards to different issuers and gatekeepers is attractive in theory. 
However, in reality the proposal likely would be even more costly than a 
Rule 176 regime. Issuers and gatekeepers would find it very costly to specify 
individually tailored due diligence details. Regulators and investors would 
find it very costly to interpret those details. Furthermore, the ex ante costs 
would be minimal compared to the ex post costs of resolving securities fraud 
litigation under such a regime. 
Moreover, Choi assumes that gatekeepers would compete based on the 
quality of standards and that this competition would mitigate the public 
choice problems associated with the capture of regulators by gatekeepers.201 
However, historically when gatekeepers have been presented with an array of 
potential standards for such defenses, they have been very effective in 
agreeing on a single standard. Whether these agreements constituted 
collusion or competition is beside the point; if market forces push 
gatekeepers to gravitate to a single standard, Choi’s proposal also will face 
such forces. 
The central problem with these proposals is their intermediate nature, in 
that they rely too much on a combination of regulatory pressure and 
reputational influences to motivate gatekeeper behavior. There is a tradeoff 
between gatekeeper liability and issuer liability. At one theoretical extreme is 
a regime in which only issuers are liable for fraud and gatekeepers play a role 
 
 
 198. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.176 (1996). 
 199. Id. 
 200. See Choi, supra note 1, at 951-59. 
 201. See id. at 954. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p491 Partnoy.doc  12/20/2001   9:12 AM 
 
 
 
 
 
542 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 79:491 
 
 
 
 
constrained only by their willingness to deplete reputational capital. In such 
an idealized “issuer liability” regime, there is little need for gatekeeper 
liability. At the other extreme is a regime in which only gatekeepers are 
liable for fraud, and issuers play a role constrained only by their willingness 
to deplete reputational capital. In such an idealized “gatekeeper liability” 
regime, there is little need for issuer liability. 
Intermediate regimes between these two theoretical extremes are costly 
compromises. Not only are multiple parties made liable for the same fraud, 
but disputes must be resolved with respect to both issuers and gatekeepers. 
Accordingly, one of the primary advantages of a strict liability regime is the 
fact that disputes must be resolved only with respect to the issuer, and not 
with respect to underwriters, accounting firms, and law firms. Moreover, the 
modified strict liability regime avoids the central opposition to strict liability: 
its perceived harshness to gatekeepers. The modified regime allows both 
investors and gatekeepers to share the anticipated reduction in costs. 
A modified strict liability regime also should apply pressure to reduce 
market concentration by encouraging competition based on the willingness 
of the gatekeeper to assume the expected liability of the issuer and by 
reducing direct and indirect regulatory costs and regulatory licenses, which 
tend to benefit only top-tier firms and to encourage market concentration. It 
is worth noting that the cost-benefit analysis of a concentrated gatekeeper 
market is not entirely clear. On one hand, a concentrated market has 
substantial costs. In general, market power reduces consumer welfare as 
producers with market power increase price (or reduce quality) and reduce 
quantity to maximize profits. Consumers purchase fewer products at higher 
prices and there is a related deadweight loss. Distributional issues aside, this 
deadweight loss argues for avoiding market power when possible. Put 
another way, market power is justified only when its benefits exceed this 
deadweight loss.  
On the other hand, a concentrated market and market power are evidence 
that the participants in the market have more to lose from a decline in their 
reputational capital. According to this argument, a more concentrated 
certification market would be more effective in policing issuers because 
certifiers would have more to lose and therefore could make a more credible 
commitment to investors who will be more likely to trust the certifier. Put in 
these terms, my claim here has been that the costs of market power exceed its 
reputation-related benefits. Even oligopolist gatekeepers appear not to have 
enough to lose by engaging in reputation-depleting activities. 
Another way of assessing the benefits of a modified strict liability regime 
is by considering the regime from the perspective of insurance and 
indemnification. Essentially, this Article recommends the creation of a 
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reinsurance market for securities fraud risks, much like the existing 
reinsurance markets generally, by attempting to shift the focus of the 
gatekeeper’s role to more of an insurance role and less of a policing role. 
Reinsurance has been successful in other contexts, partially because of its 
unregulated nature, but also because of the focus on specifying liability using 
percentages and caps. As parties seek to offload portions of risk, the methods 
of dividing risk enable the parties in the best position to bear those risks in an 
efficient manner. The reinsurance markets are not burdened by an array of 
regulatory licenses, and reputational constraints continue to operate 
effectively in such markets. Under a modified strict liability regime, 
gatekeepers still would have incentives to preserve their reputational capital. 
The major difference would be that they no longer would benefit from 
regulatory costs and regulatory licenses and, instead, would be compensated 
based solely on their reputation and their willingness to assume the liability 
risks of issuers. 
Viewing the proposal through the lens of insurance raises several 
important issues. First, to the extent parties voluntarily agree to provide 
insurance under this regime, the agreement should be enforced. However, 
there have been some problems associated with the use of insurance and 
indemnification in the securities industry. In general, insurance against 
intentional securities fraud should be void on public policy grounds,202 
although my research has not revealed any recent case addressing the 
legitimate boundaries of securities fraud insurance. The SEC generally takes 
the position that such insurance is void203 and lawyers typically include an 
undertaking in registration statements to this effect, but the law remains 
unclear. As a modified strict liability regime would face some of the same 
issues, my suggestion would be to allow gatekeepers and issuers to specify 
the boundaries of particular insurance policies by contract. The more difficult 
question would be how much insurance gatekeepers would be permitted to 
purchase; if gatekeepers were permitted to insure all of their risks, the 
deterrence function of liability would be eliminated. 
Interestingly, any perceived public policy limitations to insurance and 
indemnification have not stopped issuers and underwriters from entering into 
 
 
 202. For example, today, although indemnification by a corporation of directors and officers is 
allowed, corporations are not permitted to indemnify officers for actions not taken in good faith or 
actions contrary to the best interests of the corporation. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 145(a) (2000); 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.51(a) (1994). As a result, most Director and Officer (D&O) insurance 
includes claims under the federal securities laws. See 2 WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, 
LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 25-17 (5th ed. 1993 & Supp. 1996). 
 203. The SEC also disapproves of indemnification against § 11 liability. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.461 
(1999). See also Reg. S-K, Item 512(h), 17 C.F.R. § 210 (1999). 
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such arrangements. Underwriters consistently contract for very broad 
indemnification provisions. For example, the supplement to one of the 
leading securities law casebooks includes an underwriting agreement with a 
typical indemnification provision.204 In the provision, the issuer agrees to 
indemnify and hold harmless the underwriters for material misstatements in 
the offering documents.205 There also are contribution provisions limiting the 
contribution of any underwriter based on the amount of shares purchased by 
that underwriter; contribution can be used as an alternative to indemnification 
if those provisions are found to be unenforceable.206 The fact that these 
provisions are negotiated is evidence that issuers and gatekeepers should be 
able to apportion liability based on their level of involvement in the offering 
under a modified strict liability regime. 
If such contractual risk shifting already is common, there should be 
concerns about the current system of indemnification.207 Gatekeepers, 
particularly underwriters, already are shifting risks in ways courts might 
regard as impermissible and using contribution provisions as a backstop in 
case a court found an indemnification provision to be unenforceable. Top-tier 
gatekeepers engage in self-insurance pools with troubling results.208  
In other words, gatekeepers already are engaging in the kind of insuring 
activities envisioned under a modified strict liability regime, but they are 
doing so in a much more expensive insurance environment. Insuring 
investors against all types of losses is prohibitively expensive.209 Instead of 
providing general insurance, the current regime of securities regulation 
allows for a specific and limited form of insurance: insurance against fraud, 
recklessness, or negligent conduct, depending on the statutory provision. Yet 
because the terms of this insurance contract are difficult to specify, and 
therefore it is difficult to predict ex ante what type of conduct will be deemed 
to fall within the parameters of the contract ex post, the cost of such 
 
 
 204. See JENNINGS ET AL., supra note 15, at 281 (Section 8(a) of the Nov. 28, 1998, Underwriting 
Agreement for Pixar Common Stock). 
 205. See id. 
 206. See id. at 26 (Section 8(d) of the Underwriting Agreement). 
 207. See generally Helen S. Scott, Resurrecting Indemnification: Contribution Clauses in 
Underwriting Agreements, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 223, 224 (1986). 
 208. See supra note 61. 
 209. Moreover, if investors really wanted such insurance, they could purchase it in the options 
markets in the form of put options, but they choose not to make such purchases. The government could 
purchase put options for investors, but such options would be enormously expensive and would create 
great moral hazard. Therefore, the government would be (and should be) reluctant to make such 
purchases. Alternatively, investors could purchase call options instead of stock to capture the upside of 
stock but insure their downside, and there is evidence of increasing use of call options based on 
individual stocks. It is doubtful, however, that the purpose of such purchases generally is to limit the 
investor’s downside.  
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insurance is very high. 
The advantage of a modified strict liability regime is that it reduces the 
cost of insurance, both by and for gatekeepers, by eliminating the costs 
associated with adjudicating gatekeepers defenses. This advantage generally 
accrues to any strict liability regime, and the primary argument against such a 
regime then becomes that it deters gatekeepers too much. Put more strongly, 
a strict liability regime would make the gatekeeping function so costly that 
no one would engage in the function and the market for securities issues 
would collapse.  
Indeed, Kraakman has argued that a strict liability standard would 
overdeter.210 However, that analysis did not include the possibility that 
gatekeepers could reduce the expected penalties associated with a strict 
liability standard through the modified regime advocated here. In fact, 
Kraakman noted in a footnote that although diffuse gatekeeper duties could 
force gatekeepers to monitor at just the right level, “the catch is that diffuse 
duties are likely to be very costly. We might wish to retain such duties only if 
we can limit their costs by limiting gatekeeper liability.”211 This Article 
offers a means of imposing such limitation while retaining the prospect of 
potentially broad gatekeeper monitoring duties and avoiding the ex post costs 
(and related ex ante costs) necessary to a reasonableness or due diligence 
standard. 
Even under the modified strict liability regime, the question that remains 
is how much liability a party should be permitted to shift or distribute 
through indemnification agreements or insurance. Apart from deterrence, 
under a negligence or strict liability regime, society generally will benefit 
from allowing defendants to protect themselves by insuring. However, there 
might be reasons to force defendants to bear the full economic cost of a 
penalty and prohibit indemnification or insurance, namely, to cause 
defendants to take precautionary conduct or to deter misstatements. Courts 
will need to decide these issues of public policy. Under the modified strict 
liability regime, courts could expend resources deciding these issues instead 
of resolving other aspects of disputes in current litigation against gatekeepers.  
Finally, the proposed regime obviously would not eliminate all litigation 
risks and costs. For example, questions would remain about whether a 
particular fraud was covered by a particular gatekeeper. Does the 
underwriter’s coverage apply to liability for financial statement fraud? To 
which misstatements does a law firm’s coverage extend? To some extent, 
 
 
 210. See Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 1, at 76. 
 211. See id. 
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parties already incur costs related to these boundary issues. For example, 
§ 11(a)(5) already attempts to resolve such issues by covering any expert 
named as having prepared or certified any part of the registration 
statement.212 Accordingly, apportioning liability for portions of the 
registration statement among gatekeepers might not be much more difficult 
or costly than it is under the current regime. Nevertheless, parties would face 
difficult line-drawing decisions related to the boundaries of their insurance 
contracts. 
In general, the arguments in favor of a modified strict liability regime 
depend mostly on the analysis in Part III regarding reputational capital, 
regulatory costs, and regulatory licenses. If the ambiguity associated with the 
application of securities regulation is sufficiently costly and is not generating 
commensurate benefits, investors and issuers would be better served by a 
gatekeeper regime that did not attempt to assess gatekeeper fault ex post, but, 
instead, encouraged gatekeepers to compete based on their willingness to 
certify public issues of securities and to insure a portion of expected damages 
from securities fraud associated with those securities.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Legal scholars have taken for granted the role of financial market 
gatekeepers as reputational intermediaries. This Article attempts to reassess 
the assumption that financial market gatekeepers must be serving a valuable 
function because, if they were not, their reputations would suffer and 
investors and issuers would not use them. Legal scholars incorrectly made 
similar assumptions about other third party certifiers (for example, UL and 
bond credit rating agencies), and therefore, the assumptions about financial 
market gatekeepers deserve more careful review. 
An alternative to these assumptions is the view that gatekeepers also 
benefit from valuable property rights created by securities regulation, which 
generates both regulatory costs and regulatory licenses. It is difficult to 
separate these benefits from reputational issues, and it may be the case that 
reputational capital dominates any effects of regulatory costs or regulatory 
licenses. Nevertheless, the fact that gatekeepers benefit from certain 
securities regulation should not be ignored. 
The central problem this Article addresses is the skyrocketing cost of 
securities litigation, which also imposes substantial ex ante costs on 
investors. The high costs are due in part to uncertain legal rules created by 
 
 
 212. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(4) (2000). 
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due diligence-related defenses available to gatekeepers. Some top-tier 
gatekeepers benefit greatly from these rules and face very low expected 
liability costs. 
As a possible solution to this problem, this Article proposes a modified 
strict liability regime for gatekeepers. Such a proposal might have been 
attractive to investors, issuers, and gatekeepers in 1933, and could have 
become law if it had been considered. The drafters of the securities laws 
considered a strict liability regime, but abandoned the idea in the face of 
intense opposition, particularly from underwriters. Ultimately, due diligence 
defenses were added as a compromise, but those defenses have only 
increased the aggregate costs of securities regulation with few benefits. The 
modified strict liability proposal allows for a safety valve whereby 
gatekeepers can reduce their expected liability costs by contract.  
If investors and issuers value due diligence efforts by gatekeepers, a 
modified strict liability regime will not prevent such due diligence even if 
gatekeepers select very low levels of liability. In fact, it is very possible that a 
modified strict liability regime would not differ dramatically from the current 
regime in several key areas: gatekeepers would engage in some due 
diligence, investors and issuers would rely on gatekeepers’ reputations, 
gatekeepers would contract for indemnification or insurance to reduce their 
expected liability to appropriate levels, and issuers would continue to face 
liability for securities fraud. The major difference would be that the ex post 
costs of litigating securities disputes against gatekeepers would be almost 
entirely eliminated. This difference is an important one worth considering. 
If investors prevail against an issuer for securities fraud, they should not 
need to litigate any issues against gatekeepers, other than the boundary issues 
discussed in Part IV. Instead, investors automatically should win damages 
against the relevant gatekeepers, with only the liability limitations placed on 
such damages ex ante by the gatekeepers themselves. 
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